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ABSTRACT
Wireless ad hoc network has enabled a variety of exciting civilian, industrial and military
applications over the past few years. Among the many types of wireless ad hoc networks, Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSNs) has gained popularity because of the technology development for
manufacturing low-cost, low-power, multi-functional motes. Compared with traditional wire-
less network, location-aware communication is a very common communication pattern and is
required by many applications in WSNs. For instance, in the geographical routing protocol, a
sensor needs to know its own and its neighbors’ locations to forward a packet properly to the
next hop.
The application-aware communications are vulnerable to many malicious attacks, ranging
from passive eavesdropping to active spoofing, jamming, replaying, etc. Although research
efforts have been devoted to secure communications in general, the properties of energy-
constrained networks pose new technical challenges: First, the communicating nodes in the
network are always unattended for long periods without physical maintenance, which makes
their energy a premier resource. Second, the wireless devices usually have very limited hard-
ware resources such as memory, computation capacity and communication range. Third, the
number of nodes can be potentially of very high magnitude. Therefore, it is infeasible to utilize
existing secure algorithms designed for conventional wireless networks, and innovative mech-
anisms should be designed in a way that can conserve power consumption, use inexpensive
hardware and lightweight protocols, and accommodate with the scalability of the network.
In this research, we aim at constructing a secure location-aware communication system for
energy-constrained wireless network, and we take wireless sensor network as a concrete research
scenario. Particularly, we identify three important problems as our research targets: (1) pro-
xii
viding correct location estimations for sensors in presence of wormhole attacks and pollution
attacks, (2) detecting location anomalies according to the application-specific requirements of
the verification accuracy, and (3) preventing information leakage to eavesdroppers when using
network coding for multicasting location information. Our contributions of the research are
as follows: First, we propose two schemes to improve the availability and accuracy of loca-
tion information of nodes. Then, we study monitoring and detection techniques and propose
three lightweight schemes to detect location anomalies. Finally, we propose two network coding
schemes which can effectively prevent information leakage to eavesdroppers. Simulation results
demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes in enhancing security of the system. Compared to
previous works, our schemes are more lightweight in terms of hardware cost, computation over-
head and communication consumptions, and thus are suitable for energy-constrained wireless
networks.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Wireless ad hoc network [78] has enabled a lot of exciting civilian, industrial and military
applications, and it has been receiving intensive attention from academia and industry over
the past few years. Wireless ad hoc network is generally consisted of a collection of energy-
constrained (e.g., battery-powered) wireless devices, which self-configure to form a multihop
network without any prearranged infrastructure such as routers or access points. The nodes
communicate with each other to maintain connectivity and to handle the control tasks in
a collective and distributed manner. Among the many types of wireless ad hoc networks
[1, 2, 42], Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has gained popularity because of the develop-
ment of Micro-Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS) technology for manufacturing low-cost,
low-power, multi-functional motes. WSNs have been used for a variety of real-life applications,
for example, habitat monitoring where nodes monitor environmental parameters such as tem-
perature, humidity and atmospheric pressure; traffic controlling where nodes detect moving
vehicles and estimate their speed and direction; and battlefield surveillance where sensor nodes
gain information such as enemy movements and explosive attacks.
As WSNs come to be wide-spread deployment, security problems arise and become a cen-
tral concern. The security issues are originated because of the following two properties of
WSNs: First, use of wireless links for communications renders the network susceptible to link
attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active spoofing, jamming, replaying, etc. Pas-
sive adversaries with appropriately designed antenna and receiver can easily pick off the radio
transmissions to gain confidential information. Active adversaries can interfere with the radio
frequencies in the network to disrupt the transmitted information. They can also delete or
2modify messages, inject erroneous messages or replay previously heard messages. Second, since
effective tamper-resistance hardware adds significant cost to the network, WSNs are mostly
unguarded. Adversaries can damage or replace sensor node, capture a node and extract cryp-
tography materials stored on it, or deploy multiple malicious nodes that collude together to
attack the system. They can also launch sybil attacks [23], wormhole attack [50], flooding
attack [44], sinkhole attack [81] and much more. All these attacks disrupt the operation of
WSNs and violate basic requirements for secure communications.
Secure communication is very important for WSNs, especially for some sensitive applica-
tions such as burglar alarms, military surveillance, and emergency response. Although much
research effort has been devoted to secure wireless communications in general, the properties
of WSNs pose new technical challenges: First, sensor nodes are designed to be unattended for
long periods without any physical maintenance (e.g., battery recharging/replacement), so that
their energy resource is a premier. Second, sensor nodes have limited local memory, compu-
tation capacity, communication range and bandwidth. Third, the number of sensor nodes in
WSNs can be potentially several orders of magnitude higher than that in general wireless ad
hoc network. These properties make it infeasible to utilize existing secure algorithms designed
for conventional wireless networks. Therefore, innovative mechanisms should be designed that
can conserve power consumption, use inexpensive hardware and lightweight protocols, and
accommodate with the scalability aspect of WSNs.
Location-aware communication is required by many applications, and becomes a very com-
mon communication pattern in WSNs. Actually, lots of applications are designed to rely on the
availability of sensors’ locations to function appropriately. For instance, in battlefield surveil-
lance, a sensor that detects a tank needs to report the location of the event to the base station.
In spatial IP address assignments, each sensor needs to know its physical location to construct
its IP address. In geographical routing protocol, a sensor must know its own and its neighbors’
locations in order to forward the packet to the one that is closest to the destination.
In this research, we focus on wireless sensor networks and aim at designing secure location-
aware communication system. Particularly, we identify three key aspects when building such
3a system: secure localization, location claims verification, and distribution of the confidential
location information. We investigate a variety of malicious attacks and design several prac-
tical techniques. First, we propose two schemes to enhance the availability and accuracy of
sensor nodes’ location estimations. Then, we study the monitoring and detection techniques
and propose three lightweight schemes to detect location anomalies. Finally, we propose two
network coding schemes which can effectively prevent information leakage when distributing
location information in WSNs.
1.2 A Motivating Scenario
In this section, we use the battlefield surveillance application as a motivating scenario to
describe some of the challenging problems when we construct a location-aware communication
system for WSNs.
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Figure 1.1 A Motivating Scenario
Battlefield surveillance is one of the many location-based applications for WSNs. As shown
4in Figure 1.1, many sensor nodes are randomly deployed through a battlefield for monitoring
military-related phenomenons. A base station serves as the control center, collecting reports
and assigning tasks to sensors. Some special sensors are equipped with GPS device, so they
can determine their locations directly. These sensors are named anchors (illustrated by the
blue triangles) and they periodically broadcast beacon messages to normal sensors to help
them localize. To disrupt the localization process, the adversaries may create a wired link,
record messages at one end of the tunnel, transmit them through the tunnel and replay the
messages at the other end. In the figure, such a tunnel is shown by the dashed line between
anchor B and sensor S1. As a result, sensor S1 will mistakenly think it is close to anchor B,
and estimate a wrong location far away from its true one. This attack is generally called the
“wormhole attack” to the Wireless Sensor Networks. The challenge problem is how sensors
can still estimate locations correctly in presence of wormhole attacks.
The battlefield is very large and it is possible that not all sensors can receive beacon
messages from anchors. Therefore, sensors that determine their locations serve as location
references for other sensors that are not yet localized. In the location propagation process, if
a sensor estimates a wrong location and broadcasts it, many downstream sensors’ localization
may be impacted. As shown in the figure, many sensors at the bottom left area estimate
their locations with large errors. Such attack is called “pollution attack”. Location-based
applications will be malfunctioned if these wrong locations are not detected. For example,
if sensor S1 detects a tank and tries to notify the base station, and if geographical routing
protocol is used, S1 should forward the packet to sensor S2 which is the closest one among its
neighbors to the base station. However, if sensor S3 estimates a location which is closer to the
base station than S2, S1 will probably forward the packet to S3, which may result in a much
longer route (the orange route in the figure), or the packet cannot even reach the destination.
So an interesting problem we need to solve is that, considering that location propagation
exists in many localization schemes, how sensors can detect wrong location reference soon and
mitigate the impact of the pollution attack as much as possible.
Besides wormhole attack and pollution attack, there are many other malicious disruptions.
5If sensor nodes are compromised by adversaries, then they can claim any arbitrary location
to deceive the base station and other sensors. So the challenge we are facing is how to detect
location anomalies and verify if a claimed location is correct in terms of localization errors.
Furthermore, location anomalies are related to application functions. A location unacceptable
by one application may be tolerable in another application. Therefore, it is important to
determine a “verification region” specifically tuned for the applications’ needs. For example,
in Figure 1.1, sensor S1 detects a tank and reports to the base station. The base station
calculates the projection spot and launches a missile, which explodes a region illustrated by
the yellow area in the figure. In order to determine whether the tank can be actually wrecked,
it is helpful to verify whether sensor S1 is in the green region or not, given that the distance
between the tank and the sensor cannot exceed the sensing distance Rs. In this application,
the green region is the “verification region” for sensor S1. The general question is how we
can determine verification region properly for each specific location-based applications and
calculate the in-region probabilities of sensors.
We continue with the above application scenario where sensors report to the base station
about their detection of a tank. Rather than launching the missile immediately, the base station
may behave more cautiously and ask the surrounding sensors to increase their sampling rates.
Basically the base station should send a packet with proper payload to several sensors. To
achieve this, the base station can initiates multiple unicasts each for one destination, but this is
not an efficient solution especially for energy-constrained WSNs. If multicast is used, then how
can we make the multicast efficient in terms of throughput and bandwidth overhead. Network
coding has been recently proposed as a promising technique to maximize network throughput
and to reduce the number of retransmissions. But network coding is subjected to many attacks
when used in WSNs. Thus the challenging problem we are facing now is how we can provide
efficient and secure multicast in presence malicious attacks.
61.3 Objectives of Research
1.3.1 Providing Secure Localization
In this research, we first focus on how to provide correct and reliable location estimations for
sensors, because many applications for WSNs are designed to rely on the ability to accurately
locate each sensor in order to function appropriately. For instance, in geographical routing
protocol, a sensor need to know its own and its neighbors’ locations to properly forward the
packet to the next hop. However, providing location information for sensor nodes is a very
challenging problem. Not only the environmental disruptions are present and impossible to
avoid, but also attackers can easily manipulate non-secured location information by launching
various attacks.
Wormhole attack is a notorious attack, where the adversaries copy messages at one position
and replay them at another location. Hence, a sensor may receive beacon messages from a far-
off anchor through a wormhole tunnel, and mistakenly think the anchor is in its neighborhood.
Using the wormholed reference, the sensor will estimate a wrong location or not be able to
estimate a location. Since the wormholed references are generated by legitimate anchors, the
integrity of these messages are not damaged. Hence, traditional security mechanisms such as
encryption and authentication are not sufficient to defend against wormhole attacks. Defending
against wormhole attacks has attracted much research interest in the past. These approaches,
however, introduce high computation or computation overhead to sensor nodes. Since sensor
nodes are limited in energy supply, memory storage and computation capacity, lightweight
algorithms should be designed against wormhole attacks.
Besides wormhole attack, there are many other attacks which may cause sensors to obtain
a wrong location estimation, including sybil attack, range-enlargement, and range-reduction
attack, etc. If any wrongly localized sensors start to serve as reference points for other sensors,
then other sensor’s localization will be damaged. The proliferation of location pollution can
be very fast, and the whole network’s localization can be potentially impacted. Such error
proliferation is called “pollution attack” which is a very detrimental attack. Therefore, we
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references as soon as possible, as a result, the pollution degree and scope can be mitigated.
1.3.2 Detecting Location Anomalies
Monitoring and detection mechanisms play an important role for achieving secure commu-
nications in a system. In case that any policy violation or unexpected behavior occurs, the
system can recognize and detect anomalies and alert the administrator(s). In WSNs, detection
algorithms should detect the presence of potentially hostile sensor node, and take corrective
actions such as node revocations. In this research, we specifically study the problem of de-
tecting location anomalies because location information are crucial for many applications and
location anomalies can cause severe consequence. For example, when military sensor networks
are used to monitor enemy movements and suspicious phenomena, a detection report with
wrong location of a tank/bomb can cause significant damage.
There are lots of research efforts on designing location anomaly detection techniques, They
can be classified into two categories, namely, on-spot verification and in-region verification.
On-spot verification verifies whether sensors’ true locations are within a certain error range
from their true locations. Locations that cannot be verified are considered as anomalies. To
obtain the desired on-spot verification results, existing algorithms either utilize the deployment
knowledge of sensors in the field [26] or make use of some dedicated hardware to verify distance
measurements [11, 15, 16, 62]. However, neither the knowledge of deployment patterns nor
the required dedicated hardware is always available in WSNs, especially the general-purpose
low-cost WSNs, thus, lightweight verification algorithm should be designed to overcome the
shortcomings of existing algorithms and can be used widely applied to energy-constrained
wireless networks.
Besides on-spot verification, in-region verification also provides proper verification results
for some applications. Shankar and Wagner defined the concept of in-region verification [85].
They proposed a protocol named Echo to verify if a sensor is inside a physical region such
as a room, a building, a sport stadium, etc. Based on the verification result, access right can
8be properly assigned to sensors (i.e., people who take the sensors) to access some resources
in that physical region. As the first work, Echo successfully utilizes in-region verification to
facilitate location-based access, however, it cannot be directly applied in other location-based
applications, because the region may not be explicit and needs to be determined carefully by
analyzing applications’ functions. Secondly, when performing in-region verification, Echo re-
quires the use of multiple verifiers that can transmit radio signal and receive ultrasound signal,
and bound their XOR operations within the magnitude of nanoseconds. Such verifiers increase
the expense and require extra infrastructure which is not easy to construct. These limitations
of Echo motivate us to study how to integrate application requirements into determining the
physical region, and how to design verification algorithms that are lightweight enough not to
depend on dedicated hardware such as verifiers.
1.3.3 Distributing Location Information
When distributing location information in WSNs, both unicast and multicast communica-
tion patterns can be used based on whether there are multiple destinations. While research
on unicast in WSNs has produced many promising results, multicast is still an area that
needs development and improvements. Recently, network coding has been proposed as a new
message-forwarding technique, and it can effectively improve multicast throughput. Unlike
traditional approaches where forwarders only duplicate packets, network coding allows a for-
warder to process multiple input packets and encode them into a coded one.
However, network coding is vulnerable to malicious attacks. For example, if an adversary
eavesdrops on the transmissions between sensor nodes, then he or she can obtain multiple coded
packets and access sensitive information by solving linear/nonlinear equation systems. Tradi-
tional approaches including end-to-end encryption and hop-by-hop encryption partly solve the
problem. However, end-to-end encryption are usually impractical because sensor’s memory
cannot afford a large number of unique encryption keys, and designing robust and efficient key
distribution scheme is another challenging problem. For the hop-by-hop approach, since every
pair of neighboring nodes need to share a secret key, not only extra communication overhead
9will be caused by the key setup process, but also much delay will be introduced by encryption
and decryption at every hop.
Besides using encryption approaches, other secure solutions for network coding have also
been proposed. These solutions usually insert randomness into the network to make the mes-
sages transmitted on all links randomized. However, they consume more communication band-
width and energy which is very constrained resource in WSNs. Therefore, we aim to design
efficient and lightweight network coding schemes that can prevent information leakage, and are
also suitable for energy-constrained networks.
1.4 Contributions of Research
The contributions of our research are as follows:
1. We study the problem of providing reliable location information in presence of various
attacks. First, we propose a dynamic anchor-regrouping localization scheme to defend
against wormhole attack. Compared with previous works, our scheme does not require
any dedicated or expensive hardware on sensor nodes, such as sector antennas and high-
precision measuring device. Moreover, our scheme is more energy-efficient since no extra
communication for detecting wormholes are incurred on sensor nodes. Second, we pro-
posed a robust localization scheme to mitigate the impact of pollution attack. This
scheme is based on the novel notion of confidence tag which quantifies the accuracy of
sensor’s location estimation. To our knowledge, our scheme is the first one to address the
problem of the proliferation of wrong locations. Simulation results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our schemes in enhancing the availability and accuracy of location information
for wireless sensor networks.
2. We also study the problem of detecting and revoking location anomalies. First, we
propose two schemes to verify whether the location claimed by a sensor deviates from its
true location more than a certain distance. Second, we study the in-region verification
problem which is to determine whether a sensor is inside an application-specific area.
The latter research takes the first step tempting to integrate the application requirements
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into determining the trustability of sensors’ locations. Compared to previous works, our
verification algorithms do not require any verifier-infrastructure to be deployed through
the sensor field.
3. For distributing location information efficiently and securely, we propose two network
coding schemes which can prevent information leakage to eavesdroppers. Adversaries
who eavesdrop on the wireless communications can at most obtain linear combinations
of the original information symbols, yet they cannot solve for any single one of them.
Compared with previous work, our advanced scheme have two nice properties: First, it
does not introduce extra random information into the network and thus achieves maxi-
mum multicast capacity. Second, it does not enlarge the size of the finite field from which
the coding coefficients are selected. Because the size of finite field decides the number of
binary bits needed to represent coded packets, our scheme consumes less communication
resource than previous works and is suitable for energy-constrained wireless networks. In
addition, our network coding schemes are not limited to be used for multicasting loca-
tion information, they can be used in any multicasting scenario and can preserve privacy
against eavesdroppers.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: In chapter 2, we provide a review
of literature for the three problems targeted in our research. In chapter 3, we study how to
provide reliable location estimations for sensors and enhance the accuracy and availability of the
localization. In chapter 4, we consider how to detect location anomalies and perform location
verifications. In chapter 5, we research how to securely distribute location information by
designing network coding schemes against eavesdropping attacks. In chapter 6, we summarize
our research and discuss our future work.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Secure Localization Schemes
2.1.1 Classification of Localization Approaches
In recent years, many localization approaches have been proposed for wireless sensor net-
work. Before we talk about the security issues related to localization, we firstly take an overview
of the background of localization approaches and make a classification of them.
The most traditional and widely-used localization system is the Global Positioning System
(GPS). The earth-based GPS receivers can provide users with location, speed, and time, by
calculating the distances from at least three satellites. However, it is not feasible to equip
the relatively expensive GPS receiver on each node in large scale sensor networks, but only
a fraction of them. Generally, the sensors equipped with GPS receivers (or the sensors who
can obtain their locations through manual configurations) are called anchors. The current
localization approaches can be classified as anchor-based or anchor-free ones on whether using
anchors; range-based or range-free ones on whether using the measured distances; decentralized
or centralized. We classify the localization approaches in TABLE 2.1 (where “(c)” denotes the
centralized approach), and discuss them in more details.
2.1.1.1 Anchor-based range-based approaches:
Most localization approaches require that there are some anchors whose positions are al-
ready known through GPS device or manual configuration. In range-based ones, the distances
between anchor and sensors and the distances between sensors can be measured, and sen-
sors’ locations are determined by trilateration, using the distances to at least three anchors
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Table 2.1 Classification of Sensor Localization Approaches
Range-based Range-free
Active Bat(c) [43] Active Badge(c) [92]
RADAR(c) [4] Cricket [80], Centroid [13]
Anchor-based AHLoS [83] DV-hop [75], SeRLoc [61]
SDP(c) [88] Amorphous [74]
LMS/KF [87] DV-based AoA [76]
APIT [45], Convex(c) [28]
Anchor-free MDS-MAP(c) [89] MDS-MAP(c) [89]
Deployment Knowledge [32]
or position-known sensors. RADAR [4], Active Bat [43], AHLoS [83], and SDP [88] are all
anchor-based range-based approaches. Moreover, Kalman-Filter (KF) or Least Mean Square
(LMS) [87] methods can be applied together to deal with the noisy measurements of distances.
2.1.1.2 Anchor-based range-free approaches:
Since range-based approaches always require special hardware to measure the angles or
distances, range-free approaches now attract more research interests. In anchor-based range-
free approaches, no distance measurements are needed and sensors determine their locations
using anchors’ beacon messages. Active Badge [92] and Cricket [80] belong to this category.
Centroid [13] simply takes the mean value of a sensor’s surrounding anchors’ locations as the
sensor’s estimated location. APIT [45] determines some triangles in which a sensor may re-
side, then estimates the sensor’s location as the overlapping region of theses triangles. SeRLoc
[61] uses sectored antennas equipped on anchors and computes sensor’s location as the cen-
troid of overlapping region of sectors. DV-hop [75] and DV-based AoA [76] obtain the hop
counts to anchors by flooding through the network, estimates the average hop distance, then
calculates the distances or AoA between sensors and anchors to determine sensors’ locations.
Amorphous [74] employs a similar strategy as DV-hop but calculates the average hop distance
oﬄine. Convex [28] formalizes the localization problem as linear equations that satisfy some
connectivity-induced constraints, and utilizes Linear Programming (LP) method to obtain the
optimal solutions.
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2.1.1.3 Anchor-free range-based approaches:
There are relatively fewer anchor-free range-based localization approaches. One is MDS-
MAP [89], which is based on multidimensional scaling technique to derive the locations of
all sensors. However, it can also work as range-free approach using only the connectivity
information between sensors, though with some degradations of the localization performance.
2.1.1.4 Anchor-free range-free approaches:
As we discussed, MDS-MAP [89] can work as a centralized anchor-free range-free local-
ization approach. L. Fang, W. Du, and P. Ning proposed another decentralized approach in
[32], assuming that sensors are deployed in groups and the sensors in the same group can land
in different locations following a known probability distribution. With this prior deployment
knowledge, a sensor can analyze the observation of the group memberships of its neighbors,
and use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method to determine its location.
2.1.2 Secure localization schemes against wormhole attack
Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and David B. Johnson proposed the first work [50] called pack leashes
to defend against wormhole attacks. In their work, a temporal packet leash is established by
restricting an upper bound on the lifetime of a packet. When receiving a packet, the receiver
checks if it has been expired and can discard the wormholed packet that always incurs longer
processing and transmitting time. A geographical packet leash is established by calculating the
distance between two sensors’ geographical positions, thus the receiver can discard wormholed
packet if it travels beyond some threshold. The limitation of temporal leash is that very
precise synchronization of hundreds of nanoseconds is required, since radio signal travels at
speed of light and the mutual distance between sensors are only several meters. The limitation
of geographical leash is that correct geographical locations are required to establish the leash,
thus it cannot be used against wormhole attacks launched to the localization process.
L. Hu and D. Evans [49] utilized sector antennas equipped on sensors to detect wormholed
messages. They assume that each antenna has N equally divided zones (numbered from 1
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Figure 2.1 Detect Wormholes Using Sector Antennas
to N); a sensor listens to the carrier in omni mode, and receives signals through the zone
on which the signal power is maximal. By using magnetic needle, it can be ensured that a
particular antenna zone (e.g. zone of number 1) on all sensors always faces the same direction.
From Figure 2.1, we see that the signal from true neighbors must be received in the opposite
zone (zone 4) from the zone (zone 1) reported by the neighbor. However, signals received
from wormholes do not always have this property. To detect more wormholes that bypass
above basic checking, the authors also proposed verified neighbor discovery protocol and strict
neighbor discovery protocol. These protocols all require the existence of some potential verifier
nodes, thus without a verifier node, a sensor cannot distinguish legitimate neighbors from
neighbors through a wormhole. This will result in the lost of some legitimate neighboring
connectivity, and may lead to degradation of the localization performance.
L. Lazos and R. Poovendran proposed another secure localization scheme called SeRLoc [61]
also using sectored antennas. Each anchor transmits different beacons at each antenna sector
containing the anchor’s location and the angles of the antenna boundary lines; each sensor
determines its location as the center of gravity of the overlapping region of all sectors it hears.
During this localization process, wormholes can be detected using two properties of SeRLoc,
namely, the sector uniqueness property and the communication range violation property: if
two sectors of a single anchor are heard, or if two anchors with mutual distance greater than
2R (R is the communication range) are heard, the sensor can detect that it is under wormhole
attacks. The sensor then broadcasts a random nonce, identifies the closest anchor Li by the
first reply and takes the center of gravity closest to Li as its estimated location, which is called
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Attach to Closer Locator Algorithm (ACLA). One problem of ACLA is that innocent packets
may sometimes arrive later than the ones through wormhole, because the communications are
unreliable in real situations and messages may need to be re-transmitted multiple times before
the receiver actually receives them.
2.1.3 Secure localization schemes against pollution attack
We observe that all attacks including fake locations, wormholes, and range modifications
have a common feature, that they all provide inconsistent location references, namely, the
sending sensor’s location and the measured distance between the sender and the receiver are
inconsistent. Therefore, some experts suggested to achieve secure localization through elimi-
nating inconsistent references, using some statistical outlier-removing methods.
D. Liu, N. Peng, and W. Du took the mean square error (MSE) as an indicator of the de-
gree of inconsistency among location references received by a sensor. They proposed a greedy
algorithm [64] that starts with the set of all location references, and each time considers all
subsets with one fewer reference and chooses the subset with the least MSE as the input to the
next round, until the MSE value drops below a reasonable threshold. This scheme can effec-
tively enhance sensors’ attack-resistent ability, but also launches relatively high computation
overheads on sensors. Another problem is that it requires benign references be the majority
among all location references, and may not work well if corrupted location references collude
together and take a larger percentage (e.g. around 50%) among all references.
Instead of identifying and eliminating inconsistent references before localization, Z. Li, W.
Trappe, Y. Zhang, and B. Nath [68] proposed to live with these inconsistent references and still
estimate reasonable locations for sensors using Least Median of the Squares (LMS) technique.
LMS is one of the most commonly used robust fitting algorithms and can tolerate up to 50
percent outliers among the total references. Since the exact LMS solutions are computationally
prohibitive, they adopt an efficient alternative technique [82] to firstly get several candidate
reference subsets, then choose the one with the least median squares to estimate a sensor’s
location.
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2.2 Location Anomaly Detection
2.2.1 Verification using special hardware
The location anomaly detection problem was firstly introduced by N. Sastry, U. Shankar,
and D. Wagner [85]. The authors proposed Echo protocol to verify if a device is inside some
specific region (e.g., a room or a football stadium) to facilitate location-based access control.
Their protocol is that the verifier node sends a packet containing a nonce using RF and the
device echoes the packet back using ultrasound. Then by checking the packet transmission
time and the processing delay, the verifier can verifies if the device locates inside the circle
region centered at the verifier. Echo protocol attempts to verify the presence of a device in a
particular region of interest, rather than any particular point location.
When RF time-of-flight method is used to measure distance, distance-bounding proto-
col [10] can upper bound the measured distance from one device to another. The important
assumption of this protocol is that the device can bound its processing (XOR) to a few nanosec-
onds and the verifier can measure time with nanosecond precision. Based on this distance-
bounding protocol, S. Capkun and J. P. Hubaux proposed a location verification scheme for
wireless sensor networks using Verifiable Multilateration (VM) technique [15]. The rationale
behind VM technique is that when a sensor claims to locate somewhere within a triangle region
formed by three verifiers, then its location can be verified if all three distances from the sensor
to the verifiers are consistent with the calculated ones, because if the sensor lies about its
location and meanwhile maintains the consistency, it needs to decrease at least one distance to
the verifier, which cannot because of the distance bounding. The limitations of VM technique
are the requirement of delicate hardware to perform distance-bounding and the requirement of
dense deployment of verifiers. L. Lazos, R. Poovendran, and S. Capkun further proposed a hy-
brid secure localization/verification system called ROPE [62], combining the secure properties
of Verifiable Multilateration technique [15] and SeRLoc [61].
S. Capkun, M. Cagalj, and M. Srivastava proposed another verification scheme [16] using
covert base stations. The covert base stations (CBS) are silent to the on-going communications
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and their positions are only known to the verification infrastructure. Upon receiving location
messages from a sensor, several CBSs cooperate (through wired links) and check if its location
is consistent with the difference of time-of-arrival to each CBS. Because sensors do not know
the positions of CBS, their success rate to achieve consistency through guessing is very small.
Mobile base station (MBS) can also play the role of verifier, such that it sends a verification
request from one location, moves and waits for the response at a different location. Therefore,
at the time of position verification a sensor does not know the position of the MBS.
2.2.2 Lightweight Verification Schemes
Unlike the above verification schemes that use some special hardware, W. Du, L. Fang, and
P. Ning proposed LAD scheme [26] that verifies sensors’ locations by checking the consistency
of the locations with the deployment knowledge. They assume that all sensors are deployed
in groups (each group has a unique group ID) following a known probability distribution. A
sensor’s location can be verified only when its neighborhood observation is consistent with that
derived from the deployment knowledge. The difference of LAD from previous work is that
LAD verifies all sensors that are localized within anomaly degree region of their true locations,
rather than any precise point locations.
E. Ekici, J. McNair, and D. Al-Abri proposed Probabilistic Location Verification (PLV)
algorithm [29] to verify sensors’ locations in dense sensor networks. PLV explores the prob-
abilistic relation between the number of hops a packet traverses to reach a destination and
the Euclidean distance between source and destination. Then the verifier can determine a
plausibility (between zero and one) and create a trust level for each sensor’s location claim.
2.3 Secure Network Coding
The research on “secure network coding” studies how to make network coding systems
secure in the presence of various malicious attacks. These attacks are generally classified into
passive ones (eavesdropping or wiretapping attacks) and active ones (pollution attacks).
18
2.3.1 Secure Network Coding against Wiretapping Attacks
2.3.1.1 Security goals
The security goal is to prevent the source information from leaking to the adversaries
without using cryptographic mechanisms such as encryptions.
We can further categorize the security goal into Shannon security and weak security. The
difference between them is that Shannon security does not allow the leakage of any information
about the source, while weak security does not allow the leakage of any meaningful information.
Formally speaking, for any Mi ∈M, Shannon security requires that H(X|MiX = Bi) = H(X),
while weak security requires that H(xi|MiX = Bi) = H(xi), for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. As an
example, given two source symbols x1 and x2, weak security allows the adversaries to gain
x1 + x2, but Shannon security does not permit such leakage.
2.3.1.2 Shannon-secure Network Coding Schemes
Cai & Yeung [14] studied the problem of how to make a linear network coding system
to transmit information “securely” in the presence of a wiretapper(or eavesdropper) who can
eavesdrop on a bounded number of network links. They gave the definition of secure (i.e.,
Shannon-secure) network code, proposed a method to transform a given linear network code
into a secure one, and presented the sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of such
a secure transformation.
The basic idea of Cai & Yeung’s method is to insert some random symbols into the message
vector sent by the source, such that the symbols transmitted on all edges are “randomized”,
i.e., the message on any edge is a combination of both the information symbols and the random
symbols. More specifically, the input vector at the source is divided into two portions, the first
r = n−k symbols are information symbols and the remaining k = max{ki} symbols are random
symbols chosen uniformly from Fq, i.e., X = (S,W ) = ((s1, · · · , sr)T , (w1, · · · , wk)T ). Let C
denote an n× n secure transformation matrix. Cai & Yeung’s method is to apply this matrix
to an existing insecure network code and transform it into a secure one. More specifically, for
any edge e ∈ E of encoding vector Te, the transformed encoding vector is T ′e = TeC. Thus,
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the symbol transmitted on edge e becomes T ′eX = TeCX. If the matrix C should satisfy two
properties, namely, (1) C is full-rank and (2) the first r row vectors of matrix C−1 and all row
vectors of matrix Mi are linearly independent, then the transformed network code is Shannon-
secure, i.e., the eavesdropper cannot eliminate the randomness or learn any combinations of
solely the information symbols. To guarantee the existence of such a transformation matrix C,
a larger field size is required. Cai & Yeung proved that a lower bound of q > |A| is sufficient.
Feldman et al. [33] also suggested to insert random symbols into the source message, i.e.,
X = (S,W ) = ((s1, · · · , sr)T , (w1, · · · , wk)T ), and tried to find a transformation matrix C to
turn an existing coding scheme into a Shannon-secure one. They generalized Cai & Yeung’s
method and showed that finding such a matrix C is equivalent to finding a code with certain
generalized distance properties, which is a Span Distance Problem. When solving the Span
Distance Problem, the authors derived a necessary condition that can guarantee the existence
of a solution to the problem. That is, the necessary lower bound of size of the finite field should
satisfy q > N
Ω(
√
n−r
logN
)
, where N be the number of all edges in the network, r is the number of
information symbols sent by the source and n = r + k is the number of both the information
symbols and the random symbols. Unlike Cai & Yeung, Feldman applied transformation
matrix C to the message vector sent by the source, while keeping the code vectors on all edges
unchanged. Namely, the message vector sent by the source will be X ′ = CX, and for any edge
e ∈ E, the symbol transmitted on it will be TeX ′ = TeCX. This transformation is equivalent
in power to that of Cai & Yeung, but it is simpler because it does not need to change the
coding process on every node.
2.3.1.3 Weakly-secure Network Coding Schemes
To our knowledge, the only work to achieve weak security is done by Bhattad & Narayanan
[8]. The authors observe that the security requirement [14] can be relaxed in practice and
believe that it is suffice if no meaningful information is leaked to the computationally-bounded
eavesdroppers. Unlike the Shannon-secure code, a weakly-secure code does not require any
random symbols inserted into the message vector. A secure transformation matrix C can be
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applied either to the message vector sent from the source or to the encoding vectors of all
edges. After transformation, the message available to the eavesdropper is M ′iX = MiCX for
all Mi ∈M. The authors proved that as long as matrix C satisfies two properties, namely, (1)
Matrix C is full-rank and (2) any row vector of the matrix C−1 and all row vectors of matrix
Mi are linearly independent, then the transformed network code is weakly-secure. (The reader
can compare with the two properties given by Cai & Yeung, which are required under Shannon
security.) The authors also gave a lower bound of the size of the finite field, which should satisfy
that qn > |A|qk + qn−1, where k is the maximum number of edges the adversaries can wiretap,
|A| is the total number of subsets of edges, and n is the length of the message vector. When
the size q is large enough to satisfy the above inequality, the existence of the transformation
matrix C can be guaranteed.
2.3.2 Secure Network Coding against Pollution Attacks
In pollution attacks, the adversaries may compromise some forwarders and modify (or
pollute) their output messages. Pollution attacks not only prevent the sinks from recovering
the source messages correctly, but also consume up the limited energy of the forwarders, which
is especially harmful to resource-constrained wireless networks. Filtering pollution attacks is
challenging in network coding systems, because traditional hashing or signature mechanisms
no longer work. With traditional mechanisms, the source generates the hashes or signatures
for all messages, which can be utilized by others to verify these messages. However, in network
coding systems, the encoded messages are generated by the forwarders themselves and the
source does not know how to produce the hashes or signatures for these encoded messages.
We classify the existing solutions for securing network coding against pollution attacks into
two categories depending on whether the pollution attacks (or polluted messages) are filtered
by the forwarders or only the sinks.
Basically, the solutions of the first category utilize some homomorphic function and allow
the forwarders to generate and verify the hashes or signatures of encoded messages without
contacting the source. Similarly, the solutions of the second category create some error correc-
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tion information for the source messages. This information is either appended to the source
messages or sent to the sinks in advance, and will be used by the sinks to detect or filter pol-
luted messages. Compared with those of the second category, the solutions of the first category
save energy of the forwarders by filtering polluted messages as early as possible, however, they
are typically much slower due to the heavy public-key operations for generating and verifying
the hashes or signatures.
2.3.2.1 Filtering Pollution Attacks at Sinks
Ho et al. [47] studied Byzantine modification attacks in multicast networks and illustrated
how randomized network coding can be utilized to detect these attacks without the use of
cryptographic functions. In Ho’s scheme, the source attaches each packet with a hash calculated
from a polynomial hash function. If Byzantine modification attacks exist, the sinks can detect
inconsistency between the packets and corresponding hashes with high probability, as long
as the sinks receive some unmodified packet whose content is unknown to adversaries. The
detection probability can be traded off against communication overhead and the number of
unmodified packets.
Jaggi et al. [52] discussed how to build resilient network coding in the presence of Byzantine
adversaries. Their idea is to append the source messages with extra parity information that
can be used by the sinks to correctly recover the source messages even suffering Byzantine
attacks. The tradeoff is the sacrifice of data transmission rate. They analyzed the optimal rate
that network coding can achieve under different threat models and proposed some polynomial
time algorithms to attain these optimal rates. Suppose the network capacity is C. When the
adversaries can eavesdrop on all links and jam zo links, their algorithm can achieve a rate of
C − 2zo. In contrast, when the adversaries have limited snooping capabilities, their algorithm
can achieve the higher rate of C − zo.
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2.3.2.2 Filtering Pollution Attacks at Forwarders
Krohn et al. [59] proposed using homomorphic hash function to verify the check blocks of
a downloaded file in peer-to-peer systems, where the check blocks are linear combinations of
original file blocks. Gkantsidis and Rodriguez [40] extended Krohn’s approach and presented
a homomorphic hashing scheme (called GR’s scheme for short) for securing peer-to-peer file
distribution systems with network coding against pollution attacks. Assuming multiple users
want to download a file that is divided into n blocks b1, b2, · · · , bn. The source (and the
system) transmits these blocks with linear network coding, that is, each forwarder transmits
some encoded block e =
∑n
i=1 cibi mod q, where (c1, c2, · · · , cn) denotes encoding vector and
q is a prime. With a homomorphic hash function, the hash of this encoded block can be
represented as h(e) =
∏n
i=1 h
ci(bi) mod p, where p is another prime. Hence, if a downstream
node obtains the source blocks’ hashes in advance, it will be able to verify the encoded block.
Charles, Jain and Lauter [20] designed a new homomorphic signature scheme (called CJL’s
scheme for short) based on Weil pairing over elliptic curves. CJL’s scheme utilizes a signature
function which is linear based on some torsion points over some elliptic curve. Moreover, in
CJL’s scheme, the calculation of signature covers a whole augmented message. Hence, this
scheme does not need any secure channel and also provides source authentication.
Zhao et al. [106] studied the content distribution applications adopting network coding
and proposed a signature scheme (called Zhao’s scheme) that allows the forwarders to filter
pollution attacks. They divided a source file into multiple vectors that span a subspace. In
their scheme, the source calculates a signature of the spanned subspace, then broadcasts it to
all the forwarders for them to verify if a received encoded vector is in that subspace or not.
To verify one vector, a forwarder should calculate m + n modular exponentiations, which is
the same as GR’s scheme, where m is the length of each vector and n is the total number of
source vectors. The authors claimed that their approach does not need extra secure channels.
However, the public keys and the signature used in Zhao’s scheme are both related to the
downloaded file. When a lot of files need to be downloaded continuously from the source, this
scheme still requires secure channels to update the public keys or signature to all forwarders.
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CHAPTER 3. SECURE LOCALIZATION AGAINST ATTACKS
3.1 Introduction
To construct a secure location-aware communication system for energy-constrained wireless
networks, the first and foremost goal is to help sensor nodes to estimate correct locations,
which is the crucial and fundamental information for almost all applications. For example, in
battlefield surveillance, a sensor that detects a tank must report the location of the event to
the base station. In spatial IP address assignments, each sensor needs to know its physical
location to construct its IP address. In geographical routing protocol, a sensor must know its
own and its neighbors’ locations in order to forward the packet to the one that is closest to
the destination.
In most localization algorithms, it is assumed that a small number of anchors are deployed
in the field serving as location references. They can obtain their locations directly, e.g., through
GPS devices. The anchors then broadcast locations in beacon messages to help sensors localize
themselves. There are many attacks that can be launched to such localization process, including
wormhole attack, sybil attack, range-modification attack, pollution attack, etc.
In wormhole attack, the adversaries copy messages at one position and replay them at
another location. Hence, a sensor may receive beacon messages from a far-off anchor through a
wormhole tunnel, and mistakenly think the anchor is in its neighborhood. Using the wormholed
reference, the sensor will estimate a wrong location or not be able to estimate a location.
Since the wormholed references are generated by legitimate anchors, the integrity of these
messages are not damaged. Hence, traditional security mechanisms such as encryption and
authentication are not sufficient to defend against wormhole attacks.
Defending against wormhole attacks has attracted much research interest in the past. Hu,
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Perrig and Johnson described a scheme named packet leashes [50], in which wormholes are
detected based on the constraints of a packet’s transmission time or transmission distance.
Hu and Evans proposed [49] to equip directional antennas on sensors, and detect worm-
holes when neighboring sensors are not communicating through opposite antenna sectors.
Lazos and Poovendran proposed to detect wormholes [61] based on sector inconsistency or
communication-range violation. This scheme requires extra communication overhead on sen-
sors and reduced the lifetime of the network. Other researchers utilized [64, 68] statistical
methods to detect and filter out inconsistent location references. These approaches, however,
introduce high computation overhead to sensor nodes. Actually, since sensor nodes are limited
in energy supply, memory storage and computation capacity, it is very challenging to design
lightweight algorithms to defend against wormhole attacks.
Besides wormhole attack, there are many other attacks which may cause sensors to obtain
a wrong location estimation. Moreover, the wrongly localized sensors will serve as reference
points for other sensors and thus impact many sensors’ localization. We called such attack
the Pollution Attack. Since the proliferation of location pollution can be very fast, and many
downstream sensors can be potentially affected, it is crucial to eliminate false location references
as soon as possible.
In this research, we design efficient and effective techniques for securing localization and
location-based services against various attackers. First, to provide secure localization against
wormhole attack, we propose a Dynamic Anchor Regrouping (DAR) scheme. In DAR scheme,
anchors within a local area form a group which has a unique ID and a grouping lifetime.
When the grouping lifetime expires, anchors quit this group and independently join other
groups. While in a group, anchors include both its group ID and its location in beacon
messages and broadcast to sensors periodically. Each sensor utilizes beacon messages received
from the same group to calculate its location. Second, we proposed a robust localization
scheme to mitigate the impact of pollution attack. In our COnfidence-TAg (COTA) scheme,
each sensor calculates a tag that quantifies the accuracy of its estimated position. Then
the sensor combines its estimated location and its tag in a location reference and send to
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other sensors. Upon receiving enough tagged references, an unlocalized sensor filters out bad
references and computes a weighted optimal solution using the remaining ones. Both DAR
and COTA schemes are affordable for low-cost energy-constrained wireless networks because no
heavy communication and calculation overhead is incurred on sensors, thus the scarce energy of
sensors is saved and lifetime of network can be prolonged. Furthermore, no special or expensive
hardware are required by our schemes, such as precise time-measuring device or directional
antennas. Simulation results show that sensors’ localization accuracy and the percentages of
being localized are greatly improved using our secure localization schemes.
3.2 Problem Statement
3.2.1 System Model
In our system, a small number of anchor nodes are deployed in the sensor field. The anchors
know their locations through GPS device or manual configuration. Anchors communicate with
each other with communication range l to form local groups. Meanwhile, they broadcast their
locations in beacon messages within a transmission range R to facilitate sensors’ localizations.
Sensors that can directly receive beacon messages will first localize themselves. Then these
sensors serve as references points and send their location references to other sensors, thus the
location propagation process gets started. Current propagation techniques include DV-based
method [74], [77], APS-Euclidean method [75], and Distributed Trilateration method [31],
[83]. We select the most commonly used one, i.e., the distributed trilateration, as the location
propagation method in our research.
3.2.2 Threat Model
When WSNs are deployed in hostile environments, the localization of sensors will be subject
to many malicious attacks. We can classify the attackers into internal attackers and external
attackers. Internal attacker can compromise a sensor, obtain its key materials and authenticate
itself to others. External attacker cannot obtain any cryptographic secrets or authenticate
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Table 3.1 Classifications of Security Attacks
Fake Location Wormhole Range Enlargement Range Reduction
Internal Attacker • • •
External Attacker • • •
itself, but it can corrupt the physical features of the communications between sensors. In
Table 3.1, we list attack methods and the type of attackers that can perform each attack.
3.2.2.1 Fake location
Fake locations information can be generated by the internal attackers who compromise
sensors and authenticate themselves as legitimate ones. The impact of this attack is twofold.
First, many location-based applications such as environment monitoring and target tracking
will be fooled by sensors that report fake locations, e.g., they may get wrong information about
the high-temperature area or the location of enemy tank. Second, other sensors’ locations will
be incorrect if they refer to these fake locations to localize themselves.
3.2.2.2 Wormhole
In wormhole attack, the adversaries copy the messages heard at one location, transmit
them through a tunnel and replay at another location.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how a wormhole attack can damage a sensor’s localization. As shown
in the figure, sensor s can directly hear the beacon message of anchor A1, but not of anchor A2.
To attack the localization of s, an adversary establishes a wormhole between position B and
C, which are near A2 and s respectively. Then, the adversary records A2’s beacon message
at position B, transmits it through the wormhole tunnel and replays it at position C. If s
determines its location only based on A2’s beacon message, it may assume it is near anchor
A2, e.g., at some location s
′within the transmission region of A2. If it uses both messages
of A1 and A2, it may either believe it is located somewhere between A1 and A2, e.g., at the
location s′′, or not able to determine its location at all because it is not expected to receive
beacon messages from two anchors so far away from each other.
In such a wormhole attack, the adversaries do not need to compromise any sensor or anchor
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Figure 3.1 A Wormhole Attack on Sensor Localization
or to understand the meaning of the messages, they just copy and transmit the messages
through the established wormhole tunnel to corrupt the localization approaches.
3.2.2.3 Range enlargement and reduction
Range modification attack is detrimental to range-based localization approaches. (1) If
time-of-flight method is used to estimate distance, external attackers can intercept and replay
the signal or transmit the signal through multipath, as a result, the transmitting time will
be prolonged and the distance measurement will be enlarged. They can also transform the
ultrasound signal into radio signal, then transform it back to ultrasound near the destination
sensor, hence, the transmitting time is reduced and the distance measurement will be reduced
too. For internal attackers, since they fully control the compromised sensors, they can hold
the signal for a short period of time before transmitting it back to the sender, resulting in
range enlargements. (2) If signal strength is used to measure distance, external attacker can
strengthen or weaken the signals; internal attackers can directly broadcast signals with stronger
or weaker strength.
3.2.3 Assumptions and Goals
In this research, we have the following assumptions: First, anchors cannot be compromised
by adversaries, but sensors may be compromised. This assumption is reasonable in the sense
that anchors are more expensive and complex hardware than sensors, and can afford advanced
cryptography mechanisms to protect their secrets and privacies. Second, we assume the worm-
holes are bidirectional, i.e., they can transmit any message from one endpoint to the other,
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and provide multiple false messages which we call wormholed references. However, the number
of wormholed references is the minority compared with the number of benign ones in a local
area. Such assumption is also adopted by previous works [64, 68].
Our research goal is to design a distributed localization scheme that can effectively defend
against wormhole attack on sensors’ localization. Also, when there exists any false location
reference caused by wormhole attack, range modification attack, etc., we should detect the
pollution and mitigate the impact to other sensors as much as possible. Our algorithms should
be lightweight to be accommodated by energy-constrained networks, and they should be robust
against sophisticated attacks specifically targeting our localization schemes.
3.3 Secure Localization against Wormhole Attack
3.3.1 Overview
In this section, we propose a lightweight Dynamic Anchor Regrouping scheme (DAR)
against wormhole attacks on localization in wireless sensor networks. DAR consists of two
schemes, namely, anchor scheme used by anchors to form groups, and sensor scheme used by
sensors to determine their locations. In anchor scheme, multiple groups are dynamically formed
by nearby anchors. The head of each group determines a unique ID and a random lifetime
for the group. Once a group expires, each member quits the current group and independently
joins other groups (or becomes a head and forms a new group if there is no group head in
its neighborhood). Anchors encapsulate their locations and group IDs in beacon message to
help sensors to localize. In sensor scheme, each sensor keeps receiving beacon messages and
calculating location-candidates using beacon messages from the same group. It determines its
final location using the candidates with the maximum weight.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the dynamic anchor regrouping using two snapshots, where A1 to
A6 are the neighboring anchors of sensor s. In the left snapshot, A1 to A3 and A4 to A6
form two groups respectively, while in the right snapshot they form three groups at another
moment. Assume sensor s uses the trilateration approach to localize itself, which means at
least three beacon messages are required to calculate a potential location, then s can calculate
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Figure 3.2 Two snapshots of dynamic anchor regrouping
two potential locations in the first snapshot, but none in the second snapshot.
3.3.2 DAR Anchor Scheme
In anchor scheme, some anchors randomly elect themselves as group heads, and broadcast
regrouping messages within range l to coordinate neighboring anchors to join their groups.
This range l, called regrouping range, determines the upper bound of the size of anchor groups.
Note l is different from the anchor-to-sensor transmission range R which is the range to broad-
cast beacon messages. We first describe the details of anchors’ behaviors, then analyze the
determination of the regrouping range l.
After the initial start state, an anchor will stay in waiting state, querying state or regrouping
state recursively during its lifetime. Figure 3.3 depicts the state transitions and the correspond-
ing transitions rules. On the transition arrows, “event/actions” means that when the event
happens, the state transition happens and the action is taken by anchor before entering into
the next state (“event/-” means no actions). We explain the state transmissions in details in
the following.
1. Start state:
• After deployment, each anchor stays in the initial start state. It immediately selects
a random duration Tw from (0, Tw) and enters into waiting state. Tw is a pre-defined
maximum duration of anchors’ waiting state.
2. Waiting state:
• In this state, the anchor does nothing until the timer Tw expires.
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Figure 3.3 The lifetime and state transitions diagram of anchors
• When Tw expires, the anchor broadcasts querying messages within regrouping range l for
any group head available in its neighborhood. Meanwhile, it sets up a timer Tq which is
the duration of the querying state, then enters into querying state.
3. Querying state:
• In this state, the anchor waits for responds from its neighboring anchors who are group
heads. The response will contain the group ID and the group’s remaining lifetime.
• When receiving the first response, the anchor sets its group ID as the one in the response.
Meanwhile, it sets up a timer Tr which has the value of the group remaining lifetime in
the response. Then it enters into regrouping state.
• If no response is received and Tq expires, the anchor will elect itself as the group head
and generates a group ID gId by concatenating its node index and current local time.
For example, anchor i will generate a group ID as following:
gId = {i, ti}, (3.1)
where ti is the current local time of anchor i. Then, the anchor determines the group
lifetime and sets up timer Tr which is randomly selected from the range (Tr, Tr), then
enters into regrouping state.
4. Regrouping state:
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• In the regrouping state, the anchor periodically broadcasts beacon message within range
R to sensors.
• If an anchor is a group head and receives querying messages from other anchors, it checks
if the mutual distance between the querying anchor and itself is less than l. If yes, then
the head responds with its group ID and the remaining group lifetime.
• When Tr expires, the anchor deletes its group ID and returns to waiting state after
resetting its waiting timer Tw ∈ (0, Tw).
In our scheme, waiting state is introduced to prevent dismissed anchors of a group to start
querying at the same time. Therefore, Tw does not need to be very long but it should allow
anchors to have sufficient back-off time between their queries. Given the number of anchors
and the field size, we can calculate the anchor density and estimate the average number of
anchors per group, thus Tw can be properly determined. Querying state is used for ungrouped
anchors to send request and receive response from group heads, thus the length of this state,
i.e. Tq, should be longer than the round-trip time between anchors. In regrouping state, beacon
messages are periodically broadcast to sensors. The length of this state should guarantee that
all anchors broadcast beacon messages at least once before the group dismiss. Thus if the
broadcasting period is a constant c, the lower bound Tr can be set as 2c, and the upper bound
Tr can be set according to the environment interferences (e.g., the beacon messages may be
lost and need to be transmitted multiple times).
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3.3.2.1 Group Size Control
The regrouping range l poses constraints on the size of anchor groups and affects the
performance of our scheme. Only anchors within distance l have the possibility to join the
same group, hence, a small l can help prevent anchors at the two endpoints of wormholes to
group together. On the other side, a relatively small l would cause too few anchors to belong to
a group (namely too few location references used by sensor), resulting in high localization errors
of sensors. Here, we discuss how to determine the upper and lower bounds for l, i.e.,lmax ≥
l ≥ lmin.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the determination of lmax and lmin. In the figure, anchors whose
beacon messages can be heard by sensor s are within the big circle of radius R. Only anchors
within this range need to form the same group to facilitate s to determine its location. For
instance, if A1 is group head, it only needs to communicate with anchor as far as A2, but not
necessary to communicate with A3 that is outside the circle. Hence, we obtain:
lmax = 2R. (3.2)
Now we consider lmin. Suppose sensors use the trilateration technique and require at
least three beacon messages (most other localization algorithms require less than three beacon
messages), then we should guarantee the nearest three anchors have a chance to join the same
group. As shown in Figure 3.4, A4, A5 and A6 represent the nearest three anchors and d
denotes the radius of the smallest circle containing them, we have:
pid2ρ = 3, (3.3)
where ρ is the density of anchors in the field. Since the value of lmin should guarantee A4, A5
and A6 have a chance to join the same group and the maximum distance between them is 2d,
we obtain:
lmin = 2d = 2
√
3/piρ. (3.4)
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3.3.3 DAR Sensor Scheme
To determine its location, each sensor repeatedly executes two processes: (1) receiving the
beacon messages; and (2) calculating the potential locations from these messages. Correspond-
ingly, it maintains two queues for the two processes: Qb to store received beacon messages and
Ql to store the calculated potential locations.
The length of Qb is Tr, i.e., each sensor stores the most recently received beacon messages
within a period of Tr. Thus, we can guarantee each sensor can maintain beacon messages from
all members of any group, because Tr is the maximum lifetime of any group.
When receiving sufficient beacon messages from a group, the sensor can calculate a po-
tential location based on these messages. The sufficient number is three if using range-based
localization approaches, or one if using range-free approaches. We define the number of beacon
messages used for calculation the weight of this potential location. The sensor stores those po-
tential locations with the maximum weight in Ql and uses the mean value of these locations to
estimate its final location. However, if the difference between any particular potential location
and the mean value is greater than twice of normal localization error of the used approach,
the sensor believe it is under attacks and defers estimating the final location until some new
beacon message is received.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the two queues Qb and Ql. In queue Qb, the sensor records beacon
messages and the corresponding times when receiving them. For example, bi,2 is the second
beacon message from group i and ti,2 is the corresponding receiving time. In queue Ql, only
the potential locations with the maximum weight are stored. In the figure, the maximum
weight is 3, and the potential location li is calculated using anchors from group i. The detailed
procedure of sensor scheme is as follows:
1. When receiving a new message bj,m, the sensor stores (tj,m, bj,m) in Qb. Then it removes
the messages that is Tr time units older than the newly inserted message. E.g., if (tj,m−
ti,1) > Tr, it removes (bi,1, ti,1) from Qb.
2. For each group, the sensor counts the total number of all stored messages of group j,
34
Qb to store beacon messages 
 
bi,1 
ti,1 
bi,2 
ti,2 
…
 
bj,1 
tj,1 
… 
bi,3 
ti,3 
bj,2 
tj,2 
…  …   
 
 
 
Ql to store potential locations  
 
li 
ni = 3 
…  … 
 
 
 
Tr 
Figure 3.5 Sensor localization based on the received beacon messages
denoted by nj :
• If nj is less than the sufficient number of current localization approach or nj < nmax,
where nmax is the current maximum weight of potential locations in Ql (initially,
nmax = 0), then the sensor does nothing and goes back to wait for new beacon
messages.
• If nj = nmax, it calculates a potential location lj based and inserts (lj , nj) into Ql.
• If nj > nmax, it clears Ql and stores (lj , nj) in Ql.
3. To estimate its final location, the sensor calculates lmean, the mean value of all potential
locations stored in Ql. Then, it compares each potential location li in Ql with lmean. If
|li − lmean| > 2Err for any particular li, where Err is the average localization error of
the current localization approach, it stops estimating its final location and goes back to
wait for new message. Otherwise, it uses lmean as its final location.
In our sensor scheme, each sensor only estimates its location based on those potential
locations with the maximum weight, because a larger weight implies a higher localization
accuracy. When estimating a sensor’s location, we assume Err is known, which is the average
error of the current localization approach measured in the case of no attacks. In no-attack
environment, every potential location (and also lmean) should be within the range of Err from
the true location, hence, the difference between any potential location and lmean is at most
2Err. If the final check fails, we assume the sensor is under attacks and its final location is
undetermined.
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3.3.4 Security Analysis
In our scheme, there are two kinds of messages: query and response messages communi-
cating between anchors; and beacon messages communicating from anchors to sensors. We
should ensure the authentication and integrity of these messages, such that DAR can perform
properly in presence of wormhole attacks.
3.3.4.1 Wormhole Attacks against Anchor Scheme
For query and response messages, we use a common secret key that is shared by all an-
chors. The anchors can use this key to encrypt the query and response messages, meanwhile
generate a keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the messages. Since we assume
the anchors cannot be compromised by adversaries, MAC is sufficient to achieve integrity and
authentication.
In the anchor scheme, a group head always does the integrity check and consistency check
on receiving querying messages from other anchors. That is, the head first checks the MAC to
see if the querying message is generated by anchors. If yes, it further checks if the message is
from an anchor who is within range l of itself. If yes, this anchor is a real neighbor; otherwise,
the message must be from wormholes and will be discarded. By performing the integrity and
consistency check, DAR anchor scheme guarantees that only anchors physically closed to each
other can join the same group, and all wormholes larger than the regrouping range l can be
filtered out. By property controlling the group size, i.e., setting the value of l within the range
(lmin, lmax), most wormholes can be filtered out, especially long ones that cause severe impacts
on sensors’ locations.
3.3.4.2 Wormhole Attacks against Sensor Scheme
For beacon messages, we also use keyed MAC to guarantee integrity: all anchors and
sensors share a common secret key k to calculate the MAC of each beacon message. To
guarantee authentication, we assume each anchor (say, anchor i) can calculate a sequence of
authentication keys ki,1, ki,2, · · · , ki,n that form a hash chain from a seed authentication key
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ki,0, where n is a sufficiently large number. Namely,
ki,n = h(ki,n−1) = h2(ki,n−2) = · · · = hn(ki,0), (3.5)
where h is a one-way hash function. Each sensor is preloaded with the last authentication key
ki,n for every anchor i, but the seed key ki,0 is never exposed to any sensor. Whenever the
anchor generates a new beacon message, it uses a new authentication key and encapsulates the
key in that beacon message. The authentication keys are used in the reverse order as they are
generated. For example, a beacon message b of anchor i is as follows:
b = {i, gId, (xi, yi), (j, ki,j), MACk}, (3.6)
where gId denotes the group ID of this anchor, (xi, yi) is the anchor’s coordination, (j, ki,j)
represent the j-th authentication key of the anchor, and MACk is a keyed MAC of this message
calculated using key k. When a sensor receives this message, it checks the MAC to ensure the
message integrity, then verifies whether ki,n = h
n−j(ki,j) or not. If so, it accepts the message
and stores the latest key ki,j .
Wormhole attacks can direct beacon messages from one location to another to confuse
surrounding sensors. If a beacon message is from an anchor whom the sensor can directly
hear, then the sensor can discard this message since the replayed message’s authentication key
is older than the stored one. Otherwise, if the beacon message is from a never-heard anchor, the
messages are unfortunately accepted and stored in queue Qb. However, since potential locations
with the maximum weight can be stored in queue Ql, the wormholed beacon messages in Qb
will not be used in the final location estimation, as long as the majority of location references
are benign.
3.3.5 Convergence Analysis
In our scheme, a sensor cannot determine its location until sufficient number of neighboring
anchors join the same group. Hence, we are concerned about the convergence property of our
scheme, that is, how long a sensor can determine its location with a given probability? It is
a really hard problem because in our scheme the anchors form groups completely in random.
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Figure 3.6 Calculating the probability pl
Hence, we turn to consider a simplified scenario in which all anchors are loosely synchronized,
i.e., they begin to construct and quit groups almost at the same time. In this scenario, a
anchor’s lifetime consists of many rounds that have the same durations. Thus, our question
turns to calculating nr, the number of rounds before a sensor can determine its location with
a given probability p?
Theorem 1. In the simplified scenario, a sensor needs at most log(1−pg)(1− p) rounds before
being able to determine its location with a given probability p, where pg denotes the probability
that a sensor can determine its location in one round.
Proof: According to the definition of pg, it is easy to prove that
1− (1− pg)nr ≥ p. (3.7)
Now, we discuss how to calculate pg. Averagely, a sensor has n = piR
2ρ neighboring
anchors, where ρ denotes the density of anchors in the field. Assume we randomly choose m
anchors from its neighboring anchors. If these m anchors form a group and m ≥ m0, where
m0 denotes the sufficient number, the sensor can calculate its location. Therefore, we derive:
pg =
n∑
m0
pg(m) =
n∑
m0
(nm)p
(m2 )
l ph(1− ph)m−1pm−1f , (3.8)
where pg(m) is the probability that these m anchors can form a group in one round. To form
the group, these m anchors should be within the regrouping range l of each other; meanwhile,
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only one can be the group head, while the other m − 1 anchors choose the head instead of
becoming head themselves. In this equation, the notations have the following meanings:
• (nm) denotes the possible selections of m anchors from the n neighboring anchors.
• pl denotes the probability that any two of these m anchors are within the regrouping
range l of each other, thus p
(m2 )
l guarantees all m anchors can communicate with each
other.
• ph denotes the probability one anchor becomes the group head.
• pf denotes the probability that one of the other m − 1 anchors choose the group-head
anchor (instead of becoming heads themselves).
Note: an non-group-head anchor may have some other neighbors that can also become group
head. Figure 3.6(a) shows an example of choosing m = 3 anchors from the neighboring anchors
of sensor s. In the figure, A1, A2 and A3 are the chosen ones and A1 is the group head among
them. The neighbors of A2 are those within the dotted-line circle. Since these neighbors can
also become group heads, A2 has only a probability pf choosing A1 as its group head.
Calculate pl: Figure 3.6(b) illustrates how to calculate pl. In the figure, the big circle
represents the region in which the neighboring anchors of sensor s may reside. Assume some
anchor is at position A, whose distance from s is x. The small circle indicates the regrouping
range l of this anchor. Only when another anchor resides within the overlapping area of two
circles, can these two anchors join the same group. Therefore, given an anchor at position A,
pl is the ratio of the overlapping area So(x) over the area of the big circle. Hence, we have:
pl =
∫ R
0
So(x)
piR2
dx∫ R
0 dx
=
1
piR3
∫ R
0
So(x)dx. (3.9)
The overlapping area consists of two sectors ABFC and ABDC:
So(x) = SABFC + SABDC . (3.10)
It is easy to derive that:
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SABFC = l
2(pi − arcsin h
l
), (3.11)
SABDC = R
2 arcsin
h
R
− xh, (3.12)
where
h = dBE =
[(l + x)2 −R2][R2 − (l − x)2]
4x2
. (3.13)
.
From equations (3.9) to (3.12), we can calculate the value of pl.
Calculate ph: Each anchor competes with its neighbors within the regrouping range l to
become the group head. The probability that any anchor wins the competition is:
ph =
1
pil2ρ
. (3.14)
Calculate pf : As shown in Figure 3.6(a), a non-group-head anchor A2 has pil
2ρ neighbors.
Among these neighbors, only one anchor (A1) of the m selected anchors is group head. Among
the remaining pil2ρ−m anchors, the number of heads will be ph(pil2ρ−m). Therefore, A2 has
a probability:
pf =
1
ph(pil2ρ−m) + 1 , (3.15)
to choose A1 as its group head.
In summary, pg can be calculated from equations (3.8), (3.9), (3.14) and (3.15). Thus, we
conclude that in this simplified scenario a sensor can be localized with a given probability p
within at most nr = log(1−pg)(1 − p) rounds. In the following section, we study the normal
scenario by simulation.
3.4 Secure Localization against Pollution Attack
3.4.1 Overview
In this section, we propose a secure localization scheme, named COTA, to defend against
pollution attack. As shown in Figure 3.7, during the localization process, each sensor stays
in one of the states including waiting state, localizing state, and transmitting state. A sensor
initially stays in waiting state and receives reference messages from its neighbors. As soon as
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the adequate number (which is three if using trilateration technique) of references are received,
it enters the localizing state and performs COTA scheme. COTA consists of a localization phase
and a tag-generation phase. In the first phase, a sensor filters out bad references according to
the absolute and relative metrics, then checks if the remaining references are more than the
minimum number. If there is not sufficient references, it goes back to waiting state for more
references; otherwise, it calculates its position through weighted optimization mechanism. In
the second phase, the sensor firstly computes the statistical or geographical indictors, then
derives its localization error and translates it into a confidence tag. Finally the sensor enters
transmitting state, combines its estimated position and the confidence tag into a reference
message and sends it to others.
In our scheme, a concept called Confidence Tag is used. It indicates the reliability of a
sensor’s estimated position, and is calculated using the tag-generation function.
Definition 1. Let pe and pt be a sensor’s estimated position and true position, thus e = |pe−pt|
is its localization error. We call function t = ft(e) the tag-generation function, and call
t the confidence tag of the sensor. t ≤ T is a nonnegative integer, where T is the highest
confidence tag, e.g., T = 8.
Definition 2. Let e and t be the localization error and the confidence tag of a sensor, and eˆ
is an upper bound of e, we call function eˆ = fe(t) the inverse-tag function.
We note that function fe is not the exact inverse function of ft, because instead of returning
a sensor’s localization error e from its tag t, fe returns an upper bound eˆ. The coefficients of
these functions can be computed and stored in sensors memories, and they are used through
COTA scheme.
3.4.2 COTA Scheme: Localization Phase
The localization phase of COTA consists of two function blocks: reference filtering and
weighted optimization. We use the tuple (pi, ti, dij) to denote the location reference sent by
node i and received by node j, where pi and ti are the claimed position and the confidence tag
of node i, and dij is the mutual distance measured by sensor j.
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3.4.2.1 Filtering Metrics
We provide two filtering metrics: the absolute metric and the relative metric. When using
the absolute metric, sensor simply filters out bad reference whose confidence tag t < t0. The
threshold t0 can be obtained through training. Let emax be the maximum localization error of
sensors in non-adversary scenarios, then t0 = ft(emax) is the minimum reasonable confidence
tag. If t0 is set very high, then most references will be filtered out and a sensor may not acquire
adequate number of references to localize. Therefore, we need to consider the tradeoff between
sensors’ localization error and the localized percentage. Actually, how to set a reasonable
threshold is application-specific.
The relative metric is computed by u = fe(t)/d. A sensor filters out bad reference if u > u0,
where u0 is a preset threshold. We use a figure to illustrate the underlying idea. In Figure 3.8,
sensor s has a reference message (pa, ta, das). We can compute an upper bound of node a’s
localization error by function eˆa = fe(ta). Namely, a’s claimed position pa should be within
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Figure 3.8 COTA Filtering Metric: Relative Metric
distance eˆa of its true position. Hence, the distance from position pa to sensor s should be no
larger than das+eˆa and no smaller than das−eˆa. The relative metric u = fe(t)/d = eˆ/d = ∆d/d
essentially indicates the relative accuracy of the mutual distance, and the references with higher
uncertainties than the threshold will be dropped. We can obtain u0 through training. If sensors’
maximum localization error in non-adversary scenarios is emax and the communication range
between sensors is R, then we set the threshold by u0 = emax/R.
The two filtering metrics can be used separately or together. In our simulation, it shows
that the absolute metric outperforms the relative one in providing stronger filtering capacity,
but realizes less localized percentage. However, when both metrics are applied, sensors can be
localized with better performance than that when using a single metric.
3.4.2.2 Weighted Optimization
After filtering out the bad references, each sensor uses the remaining references and per-
forms the trilateration technique to compute its position. Because of the noisy rang mea-
surements and various attacks to the location references, the unique solution may not exist
to satisfy all the constraints. In COTA, we use Weighted Least Square Estimation (WLSE)
mechanism to compute the optimal solution for each sensor.
Assume sensor s has n references (pi, ti, dis), where pi = (xi, yi), 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Sensor s
weighs the references by their confidence tags and computes the optimal solution (x0, y0) by
minimizing the following equation:
Min
n∑
i=1
t2i · (
√
(xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2 − dis)2 (3.16)
This nonlinear LSE optimization problem can be solved by many standard methods, e.g.,
the MMSE matrix solution [37] or Kalman filter method [12], [84]. In COTA, we adopt the
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MMSE technique and transmit the nonlinear problem into linear equations:
t1 ·
√
((x1 − x0)2 + (y1 − y0)2) = t1 · d1s
t2 ·
√
((x2 − x0)2 + (y2 − y0)2) = t2 · d2s
· · · · · · (3.17)
tn ·
√
((xn − x0)2 + (yn − y0)2) = tn · dns
After squaring and rearranging terms on each side of equations 3.17, we obtain:
2t21x1x0 + 2t
2
1y1y0 = t
2
1(x
2
1 + y
2
1 − d21s + x20 + y20)
2t22x2x0 + 2t
2
2y2y0 = t
2
2(x
2
2 + y
2
2 − d22s + x20 + y20)
· · · · · · (3.18)
2t2nxnx0 + 2t
2
nyny0 = t
2
n(x
2
n + y
2
n − d2ns + x20 + y20)
Then we compute the average of above equations:
Cx · x0 + Cy · y0 = Cd + x20 + y20, (3.19)
Cx = 2
n∑
i=1
t2i · x2i /
n∑
i=1
t2i ,
Cy = 2
n∑
i=1
t2i · y2i /
n∑
i=1
t2i ,
Cd =
n∑
i=1
t2i · (x2i + y2i − d2is)/
n∑
i=1
t2i
We multiply equation (3.19) by t2i and subtract it from equations in (3.18). Finally, we get
following standard linear least square equation:
A · [x0 y0]T = B, (3.20)
A =

2t21 · (x1 − Cx/2) 2t21 · (y1 − Cy/2)
2t22 · (x2 − Cx/2) 2t22 · (y2 − Cy/2)
...
...
2t2n · (xn − Cx/2) 2t2n · (yn − Cy/2)

, B =

t21(x
2
1 + y
2
1 − d21s − Cd)
t22(x
2
2 + y
2
2 − d21s − Cd)
...
t2n(x
2
n + y
2
n − d2ns − Cd)

Then the optimal matrix solution can be given by:
[x0 y0]
T = (ATA)−1ATB (3.21)
44
3.4.3 COTA Scheme: Tag-generation Phase
In the tag-generation phase, a sensor estimates its localization error then generates a con-
fidence tag. Since sensor has no knowledge of its true position, it needs some indicators to
derive its localization error. In this subsection, we firstly propose two indicators: the statis-
tical indicator and geographical indicator, then discuss the construction of the tag-generation
function and inverse-tag function.
3.4.3.1 Statistical Indicator
We use the weighted sum of error squares, called residual r, as the statistical indicator of
sensor’s localization error:
r =
n∑
i=1
t2i · (
√
(xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2 − dis)2/
n∑
i=1
t2i (3.22)
Consider that all the references are correct and accurate, namely, both the references’
positions and mutual distances are correct, then the residual r will be minimized to zero and
the sensor will be localized at its true position. It suggests that small residuals may imply
consistent references and accurate location estimations for sensors. Thus, we intend to obtain
an increasing function fs which can map the residual r to sensor’s localization error e˜ by
e˜ = fs(r).
We do experiments in non-adversary scenarios to explore the relationship between residual
r and sensor’s localization error e. However, we notice that small residuals sometimes lead
to large localization errors. Such results are caused by the noisy distance measurements. In
presence of measuring errors, incorrect solution may sometimes better minimize the residual
than the true one. This flex ambiguity problem in localization is studied by David Moore et al.
in [69], in which the authors also proposed a geographical constraint called Robust quadrilateral
to the location propagation process. Localized sensors and one unlocalized sensor form several
triangles. If all triangles satisfy b · sin2θ > dmin (where b is the length of the shortest side, θ
is the smallest angle, dmin is a preset threshold), this quadrilateral is considered to be robust
and can be used for location propagation. We add this constraint to the simple trilateration
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Figure 3.9 COTA Localization Error Indicator: Geographical Indicator
technique and find that the relationship turns more regular. In our simulation setup, we
calculate the function coefficients as e˜ = fs(r) = 2.5 ∗ r + 1.5.
3.4.3.2 Geographical Indicator
The statistical indicator requires the function coefficients to be computed oﬄine and stored
in sensors’ memories. In this subsection, we propose a geographical indicator dmax that can
be computed on-the-fly after sensors are deployed in the field.
As shown in Figure 3.9, sensor s has three references: (pa, ta, das), (pb, tb, dbs), (pc, tc, dcs).
The location error of each reference node can be estimated by eˆi = fe(ti), and the location
uncertainty eˆa, eˆb, eˆc can be translated into the uncertainty of the mutual distance, given
that the claimed positions pa, pb, pc are correct. Also consider the distance measurement
error δdis, we can obtain the overall distance error by ∆dis = eˆi + δdis. Therefore, sensor s
should reside inside several rings, each of which centers pi and whose inside/ouside radiuses
are dis−∆dis/dis+∆dis. We call the overlapping region of all these rings as residing area (the
shadow area). Since s’s true position is within this area, thus the maximum distance dmax
from its estimated position ps to this area is an upper bound of its localization error, which
we take as the geographical indicator.
In what follows, we discuss how to obtain the geographical indicator dmax efficiently. Since
the computation is expensive to determine residing area based on the intersection of rings, we
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Figure 3.10 COTA Geographical Localization Error Indicator: Computa-
tion Steps.
replace each ring with a ”frame” and simplify the computation process in following three steps
(Figure 3.10).
Step 1: Replace each ring with a frame, whose outer/inner squares are tangent with the
outer/inner circles of the ring.
Step 2: Obtain the overlapping region of all the outer squares, called pre-area. Its lower-
left and upper-right coordinates are (Xl, Yl) and (Xr, Yu):
(Xl, Yl) = ( max
i=1···n
{xi −∆dis}, max
i=1···n
{yi −∆dis})
(Xr, Yu) = ( min
i=1···n
{xi + ∆dis}, min
i=1···n
{yi + ∆dis})
However, because of the noisy distance measurements and attacks, we may have Xl > Xr
or Yl > Yu in above equations. Thus, we make following relaxations to the coordinates:
If Xl > Xr, X
′
l = min
i=1···n
{xi −∆dis}, X ′r = max
i=1···n
{xi + ∆dis}
If Yl > Yu, Y
′
l = min
i=1···n
{yi −∆dis}, Y ′u = max
i=1···n
{yi + ∆dis}
Step 3: Exclude from the pre-area any parts inside the inner squares, resulting in the re-
siding area. Since the maximum distance from a point to a convex polygon is between the point
and one of the polygon’s points, we only record the points’ coordinates. When the pre-area
intersects with an inner square, their overlapping region should be excluded (Figure 3.10(c)),
thus some points will be deleted and some new points will be introduced. On comparing the
distances from ps to each of the points, we can obtain the maximum distance dmax.
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3.4.3.3 Tag-generation function
Each sensor uses the tag-generation function ft(e) to translate its estimated localization
error into a proper confidence tag. ft(e) should have the following properties:
• Decreasing function: if x1 > x2, then ft(x1) < ft(x2). This guarantees high localization
errors will generate low confidence tags.
• The domain of ft(e) are sensors’ localization errors, namely an infinite rational range
(0,+∞).
• The range of ft(e) are sensors’ confidence tags, namely a set of discrete nonnegative
integers {0, 1, · · · , T}.
Since decreasing function ft(e) maps an infinite interval to a finite set of nonnegative
integers, thus when e > e0, the function should output the lowest confidence tag zero. We can
construct a linear function as following:
t = ft(e) = max(0, b− T
e0
· ec+ T ), (3.23)
where e0 is the boundary value that ft(e0) = 0, T is the highest confidence tag.
We perform simulations in non-adversary scenarios to obtain a reasonable boundary value
e0. Since more than 90% sensors can be localized with e < 10m, we set e0 = 10m and believe
that a sensor with localization error larger than that has a high probability to be attacked. We
set T = 8 in our experiments. The value of T is application-specific, and higher T generally
leads to more delicate differentiation between localization accuracies. The inverse-tag function
fe(t) is closely related to ft(e). We provide the following construction:
eˆ = fe(t) = −e0
T
· (t− T ), (3.24)
where eˆ is an upper bound of localization error e.
3.4.4 Security Analysis
Besides launching conventional attacks, the adversaries may corrupt COTA scheme by
performing some specific attacks, e.g., manipulating sensors’ confidence tags. Therefore, we
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must consider the existence of corrupted reference with disguised tag, i.e., the tag does not
correctly represent the reliability of the location information. At following, we list four types
of attacks that an adversary may perform, from simple ones to more sophisticated ones:
• Decrease-tag Attack: A compromised sensor can broadcast its location reference with a
smaller tag than the true one. Since it’s worth nothing to decrease the confidence tag
of a false reference, which may cause it to be filtered out or bear small weight during
localization, the adversary probably launch this attack to the correct location references.
• Remain-tag Attack: A compromised sensor or wormhole transmitter can produce incor-
rect location references whose confidence tags are kept unchanged.
• Increase-tag Attack: This attack is the opposite to the decrease-tag attack, in which the
adversary broadcasts location references with higher confidence tags.
• Invert-tag Attack: Sophisticated adversaries can invert tags: set low tags to correctly
localized sensors and high tags to wrongly localized sensors.
For the decrease-tag attack, the resulting small-tag references will probably be filtered out
before participating in localization, thus a sensor may fail to localize itself for lack of enough
valid references. The adversary performs this attack to launch the denial of service (DOS).
However, since they can simply jam the communication between sensors or destroy sensor nodes
to launch DOS, delicately tampering the confidence tags cannot achieve any extra benefit.
In the remain-tag and increase-tag attacks, a sensor may estimate a false position, because
incorrect references are not filtered out and may be high-tag attached. However, if the sensor
being attacked can generate a low confidence tag to its location reference, it will be dropped by
its neighbors and will not affect many other nodes. Therefore, COTA is robust in the sense that
it prevents local damage from proliferating to other areas. The reason why wrongly localized
sensors can generate low confidence tags relies in the effective indicators: as long as there are
some benign references inconsistent with the incorrect ones, the statistical indicator (residual)
will produce big values, and the geographical indicator will result in large residing area and
a long distance dmax. Then the tag-generation function (decreasing function) can compute
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Table 3.2 Simulation Parameters and Default Values
Meaning Default
FM the filtering metric Combination
EI the localization error indicator Statistical
D the damage degree 20m
n the number of false references 1
P the percentage of sensors being attacked 10%
nf the noise factor of distance measurement 1%
low tags from the large indicators. The increase-tag attack is more severe than the remain-
tag attack, thus we simulate it in our simulations. We further assume that the adversaries
always generate the highest confidence tag to the false references. Experiment results show
that COTA can survive through various attacks and provide accurate location estimations.
The invert-tag attack is the most sophisticated, in which the adversary not only contaminate
correct references by attaching low tags, but also disguise false references with high tags.
The impact is that the victim sensor not only wrongly localizes itself but also computes a
high confidence tag to its reference. However, to mount this attack, an attacker should be
very resourceful to jam/tamper all the benign references and launch multiple false references.
Furthermore, the attacker needs to launch invert-tag attack to each victim sensor, otherwise the
victim sensor will performs as increase-tag attacker who can affect only the direct neighboring
nodes.
3.5 Simulation Study
3.5.1 DAR Scheme Localization Performance
3.5.1.1 Simulation Setup
We deploy 4,800 anchors and 10,000 sensors uniformly and randomly in a 1000m× 1000m
square area. The transmission range of beacon messages is set as R = 20m. Each sensor can
hear 6 anchors on average. We create wormholes by choosing their source and destination
endpoints randomly in the sensor field. These wormholes replay beacon messages with the
same broadcast range R as real anchors to sensors. The upper bound of anchors’ waiting
period is set by Tw = 10s; the lower and upper regrouping period are set by Tr = 30s and
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Tr = 100s. We simulate the noisy distance measurement by adding Gaussian noise to the real
distance: d˜ = d · (1 + x ∗ f), where d˜ and d are the measured and the real distance, x is a
standard normal random number, f is the noise factor which is set to 5% in our simulation.
We compare sensors’ localization performances using and not using DAR scheme on top
of several localization approaches. The approaches we test include both range-free ones and
range-based ones. In Centroid approach, a sensor estimates its location as the mean value of
its neighboring anchors’ locations. In Overlapping Circles (OC) approach, a sensor estimates
its location as the Center of Gravity (CoG) of the overlapping region of the transmission
ranges of its neighboring anchors. In Overlapping Sectors (OS) approach, which is proposed in
[61], anchors broadcast beacon messages in sectors using their equipped directional antennas,
and a sensor estimates its location as the CoG of the overlapping region of the sectors of its
neighboring anchors. Notice in OS approach, we adopt SeRLoc localization method, but use
DAR scheme to defend against wormholes. In Trilateration (Tri) approach, a sensor uses least
mean square technique to determine its location.
3.5.1.2 Metrics and Parameters
The metrics we use to evaluate the localization performances of sensors include the local-
ization error and the localization percentage, which are defined in the following:
LEo =
1
N
N∑
i=1
√
(x˜i − xi)2 + (y˜i − yi)2 (3.25)
LPo = Nl/N (3.26)
where (xi, yi) and (x˜i, y˜i) are the real and the estimated locations of sensor i. N is the total
number of sensors deployed in the field, and Nl is the number of sensors that are capable to
localize themselves (the locations of the remaining N −Nl sensors are undetermined).
We also study the localization error and the localization percentage of the sensors being
attacked, to further study the direct impacts of wormhole attacks on the victims. The metrics
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are defined by:
LEk =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
√
(x˜i − xi)2 + (y˜i − yi)2 (3.27)
LPk = Nkl/Nk (3.28)
where Nk is the number of sensors being affected by the wormholes, and Nkl is the number of
victims who are able to localize themselves.
To study DAR scheme’s resistance to wormhole attacks in different situations, we vary the
following parameters:
• n: the number of wormholes launched in the field.
• l: the regrouping range of anchors.
• Tl: the total running time of DAR scheme.
• λ: the length of wormholes.
In our simulation, we deploy each wormhole by choosing their two endpoints randomly in
the sensor field, and vary the parameters n, l and Tl each at one time to test its impact on the
localization performance of sensors. The default values are n = 500, l = 40m and Tl = 400s.
Then, we vary the length λ to study the impact of wormholes with different lengths.
3.5.1.3 Impact of wormhole numbers n
In this subsection, we increase the number of wormholes from 0 to 700, and compare the
localization performances of sensors before and after using DAR scheme. Figure 3.11(a) shows
the average localization error LEo when using Centroid approach. In the case of no protection,
LEo increases from 7m to 70m; using DAR scheme, LEo always remains around 7m. Figure
3.11(b) shows the localization percentage LPo when using Centroid. In Centroid, a sensor
always estimated its location as the average of its neighboring anchors’ locations (even though
they are under attacks), thus wormhole attacks do not impact the localization percentage at
all. When using DAR, the percentage is slightly decreased, but it is still above 97%. The
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Figure 3.11 Impact of number of wormholes when using Centroid method
reason is that some sensors detect they are under attack and remain unlocalized rather than
accepting a corrupted location estimation.
Figure 3.12 shows the localization performance when the sensors localize themselves using
Overlapping Circles (OC), Overlapping Sectors (OS), and Trilateration (Tri) approaches. In
Figure 3.12, we see that localization errors are not severely impacted by wormhole attacks,
while the localization percentage is greatly reduced, e.g., in most approaches, it drops from
around 90% to around 40%. The reason is because sensor being attacked cannot obtain an
overlapping region or compute a Least-Mean-Square solution for its location. When DAR
is used, the percentage is maintained at the same level as that in the non-attack situations.
Therefore, based on Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12, we can conclude that DAR can effectively
mitigate the impacts of wormhole attacks on sensors’ localizations.
3.5.1.4 Impact of regrouping range l
In this subsection, we deployed 500 wormholes in the field. Using equation(3.4) in Section
III-C, we can compute that the minimum regrouping range is lmin = 14m. We increase l from
14m and study sensors’ localization errors and localization percentage.
In Figure 3.13(a), we observe that when l is around 35m, sensors’ localization errors in
different localization approaches all reach their corresponding optimal value and keep the
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Figure 3.12 Impact of number of wormholes when using Overlapping Cir-
cles (OC), Overlapping Sectors (OS), Trilateration (Tri) meth-
ods
value afterwards. The reason that small regrouping range incurs high localization errors are
twofold: First, anchors are more physically closer to each other when l is small. This will lead
to large overlapping regions in range-free approaches and unbalanced distribution of location
references in range-based approaches, both resulting in low localization accuracy. Second, the
number of anchors of the same group decrease when l is small, which leads to less location
references and less location accuracy. In Figure 3.13(b), we observe similar tendencies. That
is, when l is larger than 35m, sensors’ localization percentage can be optimized.
This experiment shows us that DAR scheme is not sensible to the value of regrouping range
l: When l varies within a large range [30m, 60m], we can achieve the optimal localization
performance for sensors using DAR scheme.
3.5.1.5 Impact of running time Tl
In DAR scheme, anchors keep on regrouping and broadcasting beacon messages, and sensors
keep on localizing themselves whenever they receive sufficient number of beacon messages. If
the localization phase lasts longer, on one side, more sensors should be localized, resulting in
higher localization percentage; on the other side, sensors can calculate more potential locations
for themselves, thus localization errors should be improved too. We study the convergence
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Figure 3.14 Impact of running time
property of DAR scheme in simplified scenario in Section V, now we study the convergence
property in normal scenarios. Figure 3.14 shows the experiment results. We see that both
localization error and percentage reach their respective optimal values around Tl > 150s.
Notice the average group lifetime is (Tr + Tr)/2 = 65s, which means DAR can converge only
after about two regrouping rounds.
3.5.1.6 Impact of wormhole length λ
To study the impact of different-length wormholes to the victim sensors, we vary wormhole
length λ from 0m to 100m and record the value of localization error LEk and localization
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Figure 3.15 Impact of length of wormholes when using Centroid method
percentage LPk.
Figure 3.15 shows the results when sensors use Centroid as the localization approach. We
observe that when no protection is applied, localization error sharply increases; when using
DAR scheme, the localization error is bounded by less than 1m compared to that in non-
attack scenarios. As we see in Figure 3.15(b), wormhole attacks do not impact the localization
percentage when using Centroid, because a sensor always compute a location for itself no
matter the location is corrupted or not. When DAR scheme is used, localization percentage is
lower-bounded by 92%. This is because wormholes whose lengths are not very long are difficult
to be filtered out, thus a sensor will detect its being attacked and choose to make its location
undetermined, rather than localizing itself with large errors.
Figure 3.16 shows us the localization performance when sensors use OC, OS and Tri local-
izaton approaches. We see in Figure 3.16(b) that when using OC, DAR scheme can achieve an
upper bound of 6m for the localization error; when using OS and Tri, the upper bound is only
4m. Such localization errors are close to those (4m for OC, 2m for OS and Tri) in non-attack
scenarios. In Figure 3.16(b), we see that when no protection exists, wormhole attacks cause
great impacts on the localization percentage: When wormholes are longer than 50m, fewer
than 0.5% sensors being attacked are capable to localize themselves. In contrast, DAR scheme
helps maintain the localization percentage LPk over 80% for all localization approaches.
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Figure 3.16 Impact of length of wormholes when using Overlapping Circles
(OC), Overlapping Sectors (OS), Trilateration (Tri) methods
3.5.2 COTA Scheme Localization Performance
3.5.2.1 Simulation Setup
In our simulation, 600 sensors are deployed uniformly and randomly in a square field
of 300m × 300m. The sensor-to-sensor and anchor-to-sensor communication range are both
R = 25m, thus each sensor can hear 12 neighbor nodes on average. Within the center square
area, whose lower-left/upper-right coordinates are (100, 100)/(200, 200), we randomly deploy
10 anchors, thus about 18 (3%) sensors can receive adequate number of beacon messages to
be firstly localized. Anchors’ positions bear the highest confidence tag T = 8. We perform
the non-protected localization scheme and COTA in every deployment, and average the results
over 100 independent deployments. The distance measurement error model is d˜ = d+d∗x∗nf ,
where d˜ and d are measured and real distance, x is uniformly distributed within [−1, 1], nf is
the noise factor. E.g., if nf = 1%, then |d˜− d| ≤ 1% · d.
Various attacks (cheating report/wormholes/rang enlargement/range reduction) will result
in either false position or false range attack. To launch the former attack, we change one of
sensor s’s location references from (pi, ti, dis) to (p
′
i, T, dis). To launch false distance, we replace
the reference with (pi, T, d
′
is), where d
′
is is smaller than the communication range R, otherwise
it will be easily detected. We perform the tag-increase attack to COTA by appending the
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Figure 3.17 CDF of Localization Error using different FM
highest tag T to each false reference. As we have discussed, this attack is both powerful and
easy to perform. We also perform non-colluding and colluding attacks by launching different
numbers of false references to target sensors. In the former scenario, only one of the references
that sensor s uses is contaminated; in the latter scenario, multiple contaminated references
will collude to mislead s to localize at another position.
3.5.2.2 Filtering Metric (FM)
The goal of this experiment is to study the localization performance of COTA with different
filtering metrics (FM). Figure 3.17 shows the CDF of sensors’ localization errors when using
the unprotected multi-hop scheme and COTA. We can see that without protection, more than
50% sensors are localized with Le > 30m, which indicates that local damage has proliferated
and impacted many sensors. When using COTA, the localization performance is effectively
improved, e.g., more than 80% sensors are localized with Le < 10m when the two filtering
metrics are applied together.
The two filtering metrics have different performances. Firstly, absolute metric can localize
more sensors with small errors, e.g., about 70% sensors can be localized with Le < 10m when
using the absolute metric, but only 40% when using the other. The reason is that absolute
metric makes a sensor to discard all inaccurate references whose location errors are higher
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Figure 3.18 CDF of Localization Error using Different Localization Error
Indicators (EI)
than emax, but the relative metric fails to do so if the false reference contains a large mutual
distance, which leading to a small u = fe(t)/d < u0. Secondly, the absolute metric has a
low localized percentage: when the CDF curve turns flat, only 84% sensors are localized. By
looking at sensor field snapshot, we found it is because many peripheral sensors are unlocalized
for lack of enough valid references.
When the two metrics are used together, COTA has the best performance and achieves
both small Le and high Lp. Therefore, we use the two metrics together to filter out bad
references in the rest of our studies.
3.5.2.3 Localization Error Indicator (EI)
The goal of this experiment is to study how the localization error indicator (EI) affects
the performance of COTA.
Figure 3.18 shows the CDF of sensors’ localization errors when the number of false refer-
ences are n = 1, 3, 5. In Figure 3.18(a), the statistical indicator outperforms the geographical
one: more sensors can be localized with the same localization error; when n = 3, they have
very similar performances; when n = 5, the geographical indicator performs a little better.
For example, in Figure 3.18(c) about 92% sensors can be localized with Le < 20m when using
the geographical indicator, higher than the 88% when using the statistical one. The reason is
that when there are overwhelming consistent false references, the sensor will localize itself at
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Figure 3.19 Le under Different Attack Percentages and Damage Degrees
a wrong position with a small residual, thus the statistical indicator can not properly indicate
sensor’s localization error. But the geographical indicator always produces large values of the
residing area and dmax, as long as benign references can be received. Therefore, we conclude
that the statistical indicator is more effective in defending against non-colluding attacks, but
the geographical indicator performs slightly better against colluding attacks. We adopt the
statistical indicator as default in our simulations.
3.5.2.4 Attack Percentage (P) and Damage Degree (D)
In this subsection, we test the robustness of COTA under different attack percentages
(P ) and damage degrees (D). We observe in Figure 3.19 that when damage degree is set as
D = 20m and the attack percentage P increases from 1% to 10%, the average localization
error Le of non-protected localization scheme increases quickly from 20m to 50m. Secondly,
Le also increases with the damage degrees. E.g., when the attack percentage is set as P = 2%,
and D = 10m, 20m, 40m, the localization error Le is 22m, 28m, 48m respectively. COTA
effectively improves the localization performance: Le is less than 5m in all the cases.
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3.5.2.5 Noise Factor nf
The goal of this experiment is to test COTA’s property of mitigating error accumulation
problem caused by noisy distance measurements in non-adversary scenarios. We vary the noise
factor nf and study the average localization error.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3.20. We compute Le of sensors that are
localized in each round. ”Round” roughly indicates the localizing sequence of sensors. In the
first round, the sensors who can receive adequate number of beacon messages from anchors
are localized. Then the second-round sensors will be localized using location references from
the first-round sensors and the anchors, and so forth. We can see from the figure that when
noise factor is 1%, error accumulation problem is not severe that sensors in all rounds can be
localized with small errors. However, when nf = 3%, Le grows quickly as the round increases;
when nf = 5%, the problem becomes more severe. COTA can greatly mitigate the error
accumulation problem, that even in the last round, the average localization error is less than
10m, which means the sensors who reside around the peripheral areas in the sensor field can
still be accurately localized.
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3.6 Conclusion
Location information is very important in communication messages in wireless sensor net-
works. To obtain correct locations estimations in presence of malicious attacks, we proposed
several secure location schemes in this research. The first scheme DAR is a lightweight dynamic
anchor regrouping scheme. It relies on local coordination of anchors to defend against and filter
out wormhole attack. In DAR, anchors independently communicate with their neighbors to
form groups, and encapsulate their locations and group IDs in beacon messages. Each sensor
calculates location candidates after receiving sufficient number of beacon messages from the
same group. Each candidate has a weight which is the number of references used to calculate
this location. Finally, the sensor estimates its final location based on candidates with the
maximum weight. DAR is lightweight by moving the computation overhead from sensors to
anchors. In addition, it requires no special hardware such as precise time-measuring device
or directional antenna. By carefully controlling the group size, DAR efficiently and effectively
defends against wormhole attacks, i.e., it provides low localization errors and high localization
percentage for sensor nodes. Second, we proposed a secure localization scheme COTA to defend
against pollution attack. COTA is based on the novel notion of confidence tag which quanti-
fies the accuracy of sensor’s location estimation. We evaluated the localization performance of
COTA through simulations. It shows that COTA can effectively prevent local location errors
from proliferating to other sensors.
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CHAPTER 4. DETECTING ANOMALIES IN LOCATION CLAIMS
4.1 Introduction
When the sensor networks are deployed in hostile environment such as battlefield, sensor
nodes are subjected to various attacks. For example, they may be captured and compromised
by adversaries, and report false information to the base station. To build a location-aware
communication system, it is import to detect location anomalies which can cause severe con-
sequence. For example, when military sensor networks are used to monitor enemy movements
and suspicious phenomenons, a detection report with wrong location of a tank/bomb can cause
significant damage.
There has been lots of research efforts on designing location anomaly detection techniques.
We classify these research into two categories, namely, on-spot verification and in-region verifi-
cation. On-spot verification is to verify whether sensors’ true locations are within a certain error
range from their true locations. Locations that cannot be verified are considered as anomalies.
To obtain the desired on-spot verification results, these algorithms either utilize the deploy-
ment knowledge of sensors in the field [26] or make use of some dedicated hardware to verify
distance measurements [11, 15, 16, 62]. For example, in [16], it is assumed that some covert
base stations are deployed through out the field. These special base stations communicate with
each other through wired links and purposely hide their existences from being discovered by
sensors. Then these base stations can verify sensors’ locations by checking whether the dis-
tances calculated using sensors’ estimated locations are the same as the distances they directly
measure using RF signals. In [11, 15, 62], it is required that sensors are able to measure time
in nanoseconds in order to detect range reductions that directly impact localization results.
Since existing verification algorithms either require deployment knowledge or expensive hard-
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ware that may not be unavailable in low-cost wireless sensor systems, a lightweight verification
algorithm is needed to efficiently and effectively perform on-spot verifications.
Besides the on-spot verification, research efforts were also devoted to designing in-region
location verification algorithms. Shankar and Wagner first defined the in-region verification
concept in [85]. They proposed a protocol named Echo to verify if a sensor is inside a physi-
cal region such as a room, a building, a sport stadium, etc. Based on the verification result,
access right can be properly assigned to sensors (i.e., people who take the sensors) to access
some resources in that physical region. As the first work, Echo successfully utilizes in-region
verification to facilitate location-based access, however, it can not be directly applied in other
location-based applications, because the verification region may not be explicit and we need to
determine carefully by analyzing applications’ functions. Secondly, when performing in-region
verification, Echo requires the use of multiple verifiers that can transmit radio signal and
receive ultrasound signal, and bound their XOR operations within the magnitude of nanosec-
onds. Such verifiers increase the expense and requires extra deployment efforts, and they are
not always available in all wireless networks.
In this research, we designed several anomaly detection algorithms that overcomes the
shortcomings of previous research. We combine effectively correlated sensor data to reveal
location anomalies. First, two algorithms are proposed to provide on-spot verification, namely,
the Greedy Filtering by Matrix (GFM) algorithm and the Greedy Filtering by Trustability-
indicator (GFT) algorithm. Second, a probabilistic algorithm is proposed to perform in-region
verification. All algorithms in this research are lightweight because they do not require any
dedicated hardware or infrastructures, and they do not incur high computation overhead at the
sensor side, so that our verification algorithms can be applied to energy-constrained wireless
networks. Moreover, they are robust in presence of malicious attacks, which are launched by
sophisticated attackers and try to exploit the system’s weakness.
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4.2 Problem Statement
In this research, we intends to design verification algorithms which efficiently and effec-
tively determine if sensors’ claimed locations are trustable. More precisely, on-spot verification
verifies whether a sensor’s estimated location is away from its true location less than a cer-
tain distance; In-region verification, on the other hand, verifies whether a sensor is within a
geographical region given that its estimated location is in that region. If a location passes the
verification, then it is recognized as a correct location; otherwise, it is an abnormal location.
The verification algorithms should have following properties. First, they should be lightweight
in terms of hardware cost and computation overhead. They should not require expensive equip-
ment such as directional antennas, radio signal transmitters/receivers, or fast processors that
performs XOR computation within several nanoseconds. They should not incur high commu-
nication overhead on sensor side, which would quickly consume the scares energy stored at
sensors. Second, the algorithms should be effective by achieving high detection rate and low
false alarm rate. The former rate is defined as the ratio between the numbers of detected
wrong locations and the number of all wrong locations, while the second rate is defined as the
ratio between the number of correct locations that are mistakenly recognized as wrong ones,
and the number of all correct locations. Third, as the verification algorithms may become the
target of attackers, they should be robust and capable to provide decent verification results
even in presence of malicious attacks.
In the following, we fist describe our system model and attack model, then we describe
on-spot verification and in-region verification problems in more detail.
4.2.1 System Model
In our system, all sensor nodes can estimate their locations in the field using any of the
existing localization schemes. These locations are called sensors’ estimated or claimed loca-
tions, and the distances between sensors’ estimated locations and true locations are called the
localization errors. The communication range of a sensor is a circle centered at the sensor’s
true location with a certain radius. We assume all sensors’ communication ranges have the
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same radius. Each sensor broadcasts its ID within its communication range, and passively
overhears IDs broadcast by other sensors. We say sensor A can observe sensor B, if A can
receive the ID message from B. And we call the list of IDs that a sensor observes the sensor’s
neighborhood observation. Notice that environmental interruptions and permutations exist, so
that neighborhood observation is not always symmetric. For example, sensor B may not be
able to observe sensor A when A can observe B.
Our system is consisted of ordinary sensors and a Verification Center (VC) that verifies if
sensors’ estimated locations are trustable. The VC resides at the base station or control center,
and can be safely protected from attackers. Each sensor reports its estimated location and its
neighborhood observation to the VC. We assume each sensor shares a pairwise key with the
VC, so they can encrypt the message and authenticate themselves. Such pairwise keys can
either be preloaded off-line into sensors’ memories, or distributed online using some existing
key distribution algorithms [18, 25, 27, 66]. Finally, any routing protocol may be potentially
used to route sensors’ reports to the VC except the location-based routings, because sensors’
locations are not trustworthy and wrong locations will lead to loops or even delivery failures.
4.2.2 Attack Model
We consider both passive and active attack models. Passive attackers can eavesdrop on the
communications of sensors, or create wormholes [50] between two sensors that are far apart, so
the sensors will mistakenly believe that they are neighbors. Active attackers can compromise
sensors and send false information to its neighbors. Because active attackers can obtain all the
secret information of the compromised nodes, they can deceive the VC as they were benign
ones. Moreover, according to Kerckhoff’s principle, we assume that the attackers know the
verification mechanism, thus they can purposely launch attacks that exploit the weakness of
the system. To deceive the VC into accepting wrong locations, multiple attacks can even
collude together. The only assumption we make about the attackers is that in a local area, the
attackers are not the majority compared with benign ones, which is also an assumption held
by pervious works. For example, if a sensor has five neighbors and as long as less than three of
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them are compromised ones, then the VC could still correctly verify the sensor’s location. We
notice such attacks are very expensive to launch because the attacks need to compromise many
sensors in order to distort one location estimation. We leave the study of defending against
local-dominating attackers as our future research.
4.2.3 On-spot Location Verification
On-spot verification is to verify whether a sensor’s localization error is less than a certain
distance. Let Ltrue and Lest denote the true location and the estimated location of a sensor.
The verification passes if the following condition holds true: |Ltrue − Lest| ≤ D, where D is
named the Anomaly Degree. The value of D should be set properly with the considerations
of the application requirements and the value of “normal” localization errors in no-attack
environment. In this paper, we consider D as an input parameter and assume its value has
already been specified.
4.2.4 In-region Location Verification
We use some examples to explain in-region verification. The first example is the location-
based access control applications [85], in which the privilege to access some resources is granted
to people who is physically inside a geographical region, e.g. a room. People are attached with
sensors that communicate with the VC to get themselves verified and granted the access right.
Another example is the battlefield surveillance application. In such applications, sensors
are deployed in a battlefield to monitor enemy’s behaviors and report suspicious phenomenon
such as appearance of tanks or soldiers. A field snapshot is shown in Figure 4.1. The symbols
S and S′ denote a sensor’s true and estimated location. At some time, the sensor detects a
tank and notifies the control center. Before the control center projects a bomb to destroy the
tank, it fist consults the VC whether the estimated location of the sensor is trustable, so that
it can have some confidence whether the tank can be wrecked or not. Given the bombing
range, the VC first derives the verification region, which is depicted with lattice pattern in
the figure. If the VC verifies that the sensor is in this region, then it implies that the tank
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Figure 4.1 Battlefield surveillance application
is in the bombing range, because the sensor and the tank are within the sensing distance so
that the sensor detected the tank. In this example, the verification region is not explicitly
given. In Section 5.1, we will discuss the determination of the verification region for different
applications.
4.3 On-spot Location Verification
In this section, we propose two algorithms that the VC can use to perform on-spot loca-
tion verification. The first one is named Greedy Filtering using Matrix (GFM); the second
on is named Greedy Filtering using Trustability-indicator (GFT). Both algorithms utilize the
inconsistency between sensors’ estimated locations and neighborhood observations. They can
be used in different scenarios according to the application’s requirements.
4.3.1 Greedy Filtering using Matrix (GFM)
The first step in the verification process is that each sensor broadcasts its ID within its
communication range and meanwhile overhears the IDs broadcast by other sensors. We denote
sensor Si’s the neighborhood observation by Oi. As an example, Figure 4.2(a) shows a scenario
where sensors are localized accurately with zero errors. The solid circles and the hollow circles
represent sensors’ true and estimated locations respectively. Sensor S0’s true location is L =
(x0, y0) and its communication range is the big dashed circle. Because sensor S1, S2, S3, S4 are
in the communication range of sensor S0, their ID messages can reach S0. Hence, sensor S0’s
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Figure 4.2 Snapshot of sensor field
neighborhood observation is O0 = (S1, S2, S3, S4). Then, each sensor sends its neighborhood
observation and its estimated location to the VC. The VC will analyze all the information
collected from sensors and detect if there is any inconsistency.
The intuition of GFM algorithm is that when sensors are correctly localized with small
localization errors, then their neighborhood observations should be consistent with their esti-
mated locations. For example, in Figure 4.2(a), all sensors are localized with no error. The
distance between the estimated locations of S0 and S1 is less than the radius R, which is con-
sistent with the fact that they can observe each other. Based on this intuition, GFM algorithm
organizes all the information in the form of matrix to find inconsistencies among them.
4.3.1.1 Constructions of Matrixes
Suppose there are totally n sensor nodes in the filed denoted by S1, · · · , Sn. For convenience,
we assume sensor Si’s ID is integer i where i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. In GFM algorithm, five n×n square
matrixes are calculated based on the reported information from sensors.
• Observation Matrix: This matrix is computed using sensors’ neighborhood observa-
tions. Elements in this matrix are either 1 or 0 depending on whether sensors can observe
each other, namely:
Mo(i, j) =
 1, if sensor Si observes Sj0, otherwise (4.1)
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where i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n} are the row and column index. Note that because of environmental
disruptions, two sensors may not observe each other at the same time, so matrix Mo is
not a symmetric matrix.
• Estimation Matrix: This matrix is computed using sensors’ estimated locations. If
the distance between Si’s and Sj ’s estimated locations is less than R, the radius of
communication range, then the element at row i and column j will be 1, otherwise, it
will be 0, namely:
Me(i, j) =
 1, if dij ≤ R0, if dij > R (4.2)
where dij denotes the distance between the estimated locations of sensors Si and Sj .
• Difference Matrix: This matrix is calculated by XORing the observation matrix and
the estimation matrix:
Md = Mo
⊕
Me, (4.3)
where
⊕
means element-wise XOR operation. Nonzero elements in this matrix are
caused by sensors’ localization errors. For example, when Mo(i, j) = 1 and Me(i, j) = 0,
then Md(i, j) = 1. In this example, sensor Si observes sensor Sj , which implies the
mutual distance between their true locations is in the communication range, however,
because of localization errors, the mutual distance between their estimated locations is
larger than the radius of communication range. Figure 4.2(b) further demonstrates how
such inconsistencies are generated. In the figure, sensors’ true locations are depicted
as solid circles, and their estimated locations are depicted as hollow circles. We can
observe that S0’s and S2’s estimated locations are within communication range, but
their true locations are not, so they cannot observe each other. We will utilize matrix
Md to detect large localization errors. But prior to that, we should study that when
sensors are localized with small errors (errors smaller than the anomaly degree D), how
“inconsistent” the matrix Md looks like.
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• Weight Matrix: In our experiment, we randomly deploy 1200 sensors in the field.
Sensors’ communication range is R = 20m and the anomaly degree is given by D = 10m.
All sensors are localized with errors that uniformly distribute in the range of [0, 10m].
We calculate that given the value of dij (the distance between Si’s and Sj ’s estimated
locations), the probability that their true locations are within communication range.
The results are shown in Figure 4.3(a). We observe that when dij grows from 0m to
40m, the probability drops from 1 to 0 gradually. We fit the scatter points using a
simple segment-wise function f(x). Furthermore, we derive another function F (x) named
“weight function” using f(x):
F (x) =
 f(x), if x ≤ R1− f(x), if x > R (4.4)
As shown in Figure 4.3(b), the value of F (x) indicates the probability that sensors’
reported information is consistent. More precisely, when x = dij is greater (smaller) than
R = 20m, F (x) is the probability that the mutual distance between their true locations
is greater (smaller) than R. We can also consider the value of F (x) as the “weight” of
the consistencies, and obtain the weight matrix Mw using the weight function, namely:
Mw(i, j) = F (dij), (4.5)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, and dij is the distance between Si’s and Sj ’s estimated loca-
tions.
• Inconsistency Matrix: We multiply each element in the difference matrix with the
corresponding element in the weight matrix, and obtain the inconsistency matrix Minc:
Minc = Md
⊙
Mw, (4.6)
where
⊙
denotes element-wise multiplication. We will utilize this matrix to greedily
filter out the locations that cause greater inconsistencies than other locations. Notice
that for a sensor Si where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the inconsistencies brought by this sensor are
represented by the nonzero elements in the ith row and the ith column in matrix Minc.
In the following, we first define several metrics that are used in the filtering process.
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Figure 4.3 Weight function
4.3.1.2 Metric for filtering Abnormal locations
• Active Difference Metric:
ADi =
n∑
k=1
Minc(i, k), (4.7)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a sensor Si, metric ADi is the sum of elements in ith row of
matrix Minc. This metric quantifies the inconsistency between sensor Si’s neighborhood
observation and the estimated locations.
• Passive Difference Metric:
PDi =
n∑
k=1
Minc(k, i), (4.8)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a sensor Si, metric PDi is the sum of elements in ith
column of matrix Minc. This metric quantifies the inconsistency between other sensors’
observation on Si (namely, sensor Si is passively observed) and the estimated locations
of sensors.
• Asymmetry Metric:
ASi =
n∑
k=1
|Minc(i, k)−Minc(k, i)|, (4.9)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. In non-attack environment, sensors’ observations are not sym-
metric due to environmental disturbance. However, if such asymmetry is greater than
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a threshold (an extreme case is that a sensor can observe all its neighbors, but none of
these neighbors can observe itself), then there may be some anomalies.
• Consistent-Neighbor Metric:
CNi =
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
Mo(k, i)×Me(k, i), (4.10)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. This metric counts the number of a sensor’s consistent neighbors.
Here we define that a sensor Sk is a consistent neighbor of sensor Si if it can observe Si
and its estimated location is in the communication range of Si’s estimated location.
4.3.1.3 Greedy Filtering Procedure
In this section, we describe how GFM algorithm calculates all the above matrixes and
utilizes filtering metrics to greedily filter out abnormal locations.
The procedure is shown in Figure 4.4. In the first round, VC computes matrix Minc and
metrics ADi, PDi and ASi for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. If there is any sensor whose metric value
exceed that metric’s threshold, VC revokes the sensor that has the largest metric value (say
node Sk), and sets all zeros to the k
th row and the kth column in matrixes Me, Mo and
Minc. This process repeats until no more sensors can be filtered out. Then the metric CNi
is considered: sensors that do not have enough number of consistent neighbors are revoked.
Finally, the remaining sensors are accepted by the VC as correctly-localized sensors.
In the above procedure, the threshold for different metric can be obtained through off-line
training using experimental data. In our simulations, we deploy sensors randomly in a square
field and localize them with errors less than the anomaly degree. Then we compute all the
matrixes and the values of ADi, PDi, ASi and CNi for all sensors. The threshold value is
determined according to the desired false alarm rate. For example, if the application requires
that the false alarm rate should be smaller than 5%, then we set the thresholds for metric AD,
PD and AS at the 95% percentile and the threshold for metric CN at the 5% percentile. Given
the value of communication range radius, the node density, the accuracy of the localization
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Compute matrix Minc ( 1)
Compute metrics AD, PD, AS for all sensors ( 2)
While (sensor Si exists that can be filtered out) ( 3)
if ADi > AD-threshold ( 4)
revoke Sk that ADk is the largest among all sensors ( 5)
else if PDi > PD-threshold ( 6)
revoke Sk that PDk is the largest among all sensors ( 7)
else if ASi > AS-threshold ( 8)
revoke Sk that ASk is the largest among all sensors ( 9)
set zeros to kth row and kth column in Me, Mo, Minc (10)
recompute metrics AD, PD, AS for all sensors (12)
While (sensor Si exists that CNi < CN -threshold) (13)
revoke sensor Si for not having enough neighbors (14)
Remaining sensors are accepted (15)
Figure 4.4 The Greedy Filtering by Matrix (GFM) Algorithm
algorithms used in the filed and the environmental parameters, we can construct experiments
accordingly and obtain the above threshold values.
4.3.1.4 Security Analysis
Just like the adversaries can attack the localization schemes to make sensors’ locations
wrongly estimated, they can also attack the verification algorithm to make abnormal locations
NOT to be detected by the VC. To achieve this goal, the attackers will compromise a sensor and
force it to report fake neighborhood observation that is consistent with the claimed location.
We illustrate such an attack in Figure 4.5. In the figure, sensor S4 is compromised and
localized at location L′ that is far away from its true location L. If sensor S4 reports the true
observation O4 = (S1, S2, S3), then the GFM algorithm will easily find inconsistencies because
the estimated locations of sensors S1, S2 and S3 are far away from location L
′. To escape
from being detected, S4 may report a fake neighborhood observation O4 = (S5, S6, S7), which
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Figure 4.6 GFM matrixes under attacks
include sensors that are localized in the neighborhood of location L′.
We will use the above example to analyze GFM algorithm’s performance. In Figure 4.6,
the elements in the 4th row and in the 4th column of matrix Md are shown. For simplicity,
weight matrix Mw is not involved here. Based on this matrix, the metric values for sensor S4
are AD4 = 0, PD4 = 6 and AS4 = 6. The values of PD4 and AS4 are very high, hence, it is
very probable that S4 will be revoked.
To further mitigate the inconsistencies, S4 may not broadcast its ID message, thus none of
S1, S2 and S3 can observe sensor S4. The elements are recalculated in the difference matrix
Md, and the metric values become AD4 = 0, PD4 = 3 and AS4 = 3. In this scenario, according
to the definition of consistent neighbors in equation (4.10), the consistent-neighbor metric is
CN4 = 0, so that S4 will be revoked during the final check at line (13)-(14) in Figure 4.4.
Inconsistency can be completed removed if sensors S4, S5, S6 and S7 are all compro-
mised. Sensor S4 does not broadcast its ID, and reports a fake neighborhood observation
O4 = (S5, S6, S7); meanwhile, sensors S5, S6 and S7 all report to observe S4. Such colluding
attack is expensive to launch and is against our assumption in Section 2 that the majority of
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sensors are benign in a local area. Therefore, we conclude that as long as the adversaries can-
not compromise majority sensors in a local area, inconsistencies always exist and localization
anomaly can be detected. Simulation results also prove the effectiveness and robustness of the
GFM algorithm.
4.3.2 Greedy Filtering using Trustability-indicator
In GFT algorithm, VC computes a trustability indicator for each sensor and updates the
indicator’s value in multiple rounds. In each round, if a sensor’s indicator is higher than the
threshold, the sensor is accepted as correctly-localized sensor. Such iteration stops when all
sensors’ indicators become stable. Finally, the sensors that have indicator values lower than
the threshold are detected and revoked.
4.3.2.1 Calculation of Trustability-indicator
The trustability indicator of sensor Si (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}) is calculated in multiple rounds.
Initially, all indicators are set to 0.5 in round 0. In round k > 0, sensor Si’s indicator is denoted
by Iki and calculated by:
Iki =
∑
Sj∈Ni T
k
ij · Ik−1j∑
Sj∈Ni I
k−1
j
, (4.11)
where Ni denotes the set of sensors that can observe sensor Si. For each sensor Sj in this set,
the symbol Ik−1j denotes Sj ’s indicator in the previous round. So actually I
k
i is calculated as
a weighted average of all its neighbors’ indicators in the previous round, where the weight T kij
is calculated based on the geographical relationship between Si and Sj . In the following, we
discuss how to calculate the weight factor in detail.
4.3.2.2 Calculation of Weights
According to the definition in equation (4.10), for each sensor that can observe Si, if its
estimated locations is within communication range of sensor Si’s estimated location, then this
sensor is considered a consistent neighbor; otherwise, it is an inconsistent neighbor.
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Figure 4.7 Compute temporary indicator
• Compute the weight using consistent neighbor: We discuss how to compute T kij
using a consistent neighbor. As shown in Figure 4.7, the distance between sensor Si’s
and Sj ’s estimated locations is dij ; R is the radius of the communication range; D is the
anomaly degree. Verifying whether sensor Si’s localization error is smaller than D equals
verifying whether Si’s true location is in circle Cr. We compute the following probability:
P (Si ∈ Cr) = P (Si ∈ Cr|Si ∈ Cl) · P (Si ∈ Cl)
+P (Si ∈ Cr|Si /∈ Cl) · P (Si /∈ Cl)
≈ P (Si ∈ Cr|Si ∈ Cl) · P (Si ∈ Cl)
= (So/Sl) · f(dij), (4.12)
where the approximation follows because the conditional probability P (Si ∈ Cr|Si /∈ Cl)
is very small. So denotes the area of the overlapping region, and Sl denotes the area
of the circle Cl. Function f(x) is the segment-wise function defined in Figure 4.3(a).
Because consistent neighbors help to enhance the trustability of sensor Si, we increase
Si’s previous indicator by the amount in equation (4.12), and get the weight T
k
ij as follows:
T kij = I
k−1
i + P (Si ∈ Cr) (4.13)
• Compute the weight using inconsistent neighbor: We compute the probability
that sensor Si cannot be verified, namely, the probability that sensor Si’s true location
is outside the circle Cr in Figure 4.7, such that:
P (i /∈ Cr) = 1− (So/Sl) · f(dij) (4.14)
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To the opposite of consistent neighbors, inconsistent neighbors should reduce the trusta-
bility of sensor Si’s location, therefore, we decrease Si’s previous indicator by the amount
in the above equation and calculate the weight as follows:
T kij = max{Ik−1i − P (Si /∈ Cr), 0} (4.15)
In each round, the VC calculates the weights using both consistent and inconsistent neighbors
of a sensor, then update the sensor’s indicator using equation (4.11).
4.3.2.3 Greedy Filtering Procedure
As shown in Figure 4.8, in each round, the VC updates each sensor’s trustability indicator,
then verifies any sensor if its indicator is greater than the threshold. If a sensor’s indicator
changes with negligibly small amount in two consecutive rounds, VC recognizes that the indi-
cator has converged and stops updating its value. Threshold can be obtained through training
on experimental data. We run GFT algorithm in non-attack environment and calculate the
indicators for all sensors. Then we set the threshold according to the desired false alarm rate.
If the false alarm rate is 0.5%, then the threshold will equal to the 99.5% percentile of all
sensors’ indicators.
Assign initial value of 0.5 to all sensors ( 1)
For round k = 1 to N ( 2)
For each sensor Si ( 3)
update Si’s indicator from I
k−1
i to I
k
i ( 4)
if Iki > threshold ( 5)
accept sensor Si and stop updating its indicator ( 6)
if |Iki − Ik−1i | < 0.05 ( 7)
stop updating the indicator in future rounds ( 8)
Verify sensors that have indicators greater than the threshold ( 9)
Figure 4.8 The GFT Algorithm
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4.3.2.4 Security analysis
In GFT algorithm, consistent neighbors can increase a sensor’s indicator, and inconsistent
neighbors can decrease it. Knowing the filtering process of GFT, attackers will purposely avoid
being revoked by generating as many consistent neighbors as possible for a victim sensor. To
achieve this goal, the sensor being compromised needs to keep silent of its ID; otherwise, it will
be observed by surrounding sensors that will become its inconsistent neighbors. On the other
hand, the sensors that are around the estimated location of the compromised sensor need to
claim to “observe” this sensor, so that they could become consistent neighbors of this sensor.
However, we notice as long as majority sensors are benign in a local area, they will become
inconsistent neighbors and reduce the sensor’s trustability. Simulation results demonstrate
that GFT algorithm is resilient and has satisfiable performance under such attacks.
4.4 In-region Location Verification
In this section, we propose a lightweight algorithm that the VC can use to perform in-region
verification. Before we describe the algorithm, we first need to figure out how to determine
the region inside which a sensor’s location should be verified.
4.4.1 Verification Region Determination
Given a location-based application, we define the verification region as the physical region
inside which the sensor should be verified if and only if the application goal can be achieved:
Application goal is fulfilled⇔ Li ∈ Vi, (4.16)
where Li is the true location of sensor Si, and Vi is the verification region for sensor Si. Notice
that the verification region for different sensors may be different. In addition, we define two
variants to the above region, and name them sufficient region and necessary region respectively:
Application goal is fulfilled ⇐ Li ∈ V˜i, (4.17)
Application goal is fulfilled ⇒ Li ∈ Vˆi, (4.18)
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where V˜i is the sufficient region and Vˆi is the necessary region. From the geographical point of
view, region V˜i is fully contained by region Vˆi.
In the following, we use a location-based surveillance application to demonstrate how the
verification region can be determined.
4.4.1.1 Battlefield surveillance
In battlefield surveillance, sensors that detect a suspicious object will inform the control
center to destroy the object. There can be many approaches to determining the projection
location, for simplicity, we assume it is the average location of all the estimated locations of
the sensors that detect the tank. We do not require sensors to be equipped with any special
hardware such as antennas or distance-measuring devices, however, the determination of the
verification regions of sensors will be different depending on whether the angle and distance
information are available.
Some notations we will use are as follows: the bombing range is Cx, the center and radius
of Cx is Px and Rx, the sensing distance is Rs, the true location of the tank is Lt, and sensor
Si’s true and estimated location is Li and L
′
i.
• Distance and angle are known. If both distance and angle information are available,
i.e., each sensor reports the distance and the direction that the object is from itself, then
the problem is:
Given |−−→LiLt| = di, 6 −−→LiLt = αi, and Cx,
determine the verification region Vi, such that
Lt ∈ Cx ⇔ Li ∈ Vi. (4.19)
We use the example in Figure 4.9 to further clarify the above problem. In the figure, two
sensors S1 and S2 detect the tank. The bombing center Px and the bombing range Cx
are given to the VC. The distance and angle from sensor S1 to the tank are d1 and α1,
respectively. The problem is to determine a verification region V1 that satisfies equation
(4.19). The solution to this problem is not difficult to find: We can move Cx for distance
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Figure 4.9 Verification regions (when distance and angle can be measured)
d1 in the direction of α1 + pi to get V1. It can be proved that if and only if sensor s1 is
inside V1, then the tank will be inside Cx. The verification region V2 for sensor s2 can
be determined similarly. The solution is formalized as followings:
Vi = T (Cx, αi + pi, di), (4.20)
where T (x, y, z) is the operation of geometry translation, i.e., it moves every point of
region x along the direction of y for a distance of z.
• Angle is known and distance is unknown. Since di is unknown, the solution given
by equation (4.20) does not exist. Thus we find a pair of sufficient/necessary regions:
Given |−−→LiLt| ≤ Rs, 6 −−→LiLt = αi, and Cx,
determine a pair of verification regions, such that
Lt ∈ Cx ⇐ Li ∈ V˜i, (4.21)
Lt ∈ Cx ⇒ Li ∈ Vˆi, (4.22)
where the constraint |−−→LiLt| ≤ Rs means that the tank is within the sensing distance of
the sensor, otherwise, it would not have been detected. The solution are not difficult to
find: The sufficient region is the intersection of all transformed regions that have moving
distance in the range [0, Rs], and the necessary region is the union of all such transformed
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Figure 4.10 Verification regions for S1 (known angle, unknown distance)
regions, namely:
V˜i =
⋂
di∈[0,Rs] T (Cx, αi + pi, di) (4.23)
Vˆi =
⋃
di∈[0,Rs] T (Cx, αi + pi, di) (4.24)
where
⋂
is the intersection operation and
⋃
is the union operations. An example in
Figure 4.10 shows how the sufficient region and necessary region can be calculated.
• Angle is unknown and distance is known. Without the information of the direction,
the solution given by equation (4.20) does not exist either. In this scenario, the sufficient
region should be a circle centered at the bombing center Px and with a radius of Rx−di.
It is easy to verify that if the sensor is in this circle, then the tank will be in a circle
centered at Px with radius Rx, which is exactly the bombing range Cx. Similarly, the
necessary region can also be determined. The solutions are given by following formulas:
V˜i = C(Px, Rx − di), (4.25)
Vˆi = C(Px, Rx + di), (4.26)
where C(x, y) denotes a circle centered at location x with radius y.
• Both angle and distance are unknown. If neither angle or distance information is
known, then we can only infer that the tank is within the sensing distance Rs from the
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Figure 4.11 Snapshot of the field: sensor s1 has three neighbors s2, s3, s4
sensor. The sufficient region and necessary region are two concentric circles that center
at Px, and their radius are Rx −Rs and Rx +Rs respectively:
V˜i = C(Px, Rx −Rs), (4.27)
Vˆi = C(Px, Rx +Rs) (4.28)
We have analyzed how the verification region can be determined under different scenarios.
In other application, the verification region may or may not be explicitly given, and it relies
on the VC to derive it properly. Basically, the application goal should be quantified and the
geographical relationship between sensors and the object of interest needs to be explored, then
the verification region or a pair of sufficient/necessary regions can be derived using equation
(4.16) or equations (4.17)(4.18).
4.4.2 In-region Verification
In this section, we propose a lightweight algorithm that the VC can use to perform in-region
verifications. This algorithm also utilizes sensors’ neighborhood observations as we described
in section 4.1. Basically, if two sensors observe each other, then the VC consider them to be
a pair of “confirmed” neighbors. Then, VC derives a probability distribution for each sensor,
which indicates how probably the sensor is at each point in the field. The distribution function
can be either continuous or discrete. In the continuous version, the in-region confidence is
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t2 
t1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ••• 
1 16.67 83.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
2 2.17 22.24 75.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
3 0.22 4.09 27.18 68.51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
4 0 0.58 6.09 30.52 62.81 0 0 0 0 0 0  
5 0 0.07 0.93 8.39 32.74 57.87 0 0 0 0 0  
6 0 0 0.16 1.51 10.25 36.21 51.87 0 0 0 0  
7 0 0 0.05 0.29 2.60 12.46 37.14 47.46 0 0 0  
8 0 0 0 0.05 0.40 3.20 14.80 38.28 43.27 0 0  
9 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.84 4.42 16.74 38.04 39.90 0  
10 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.15 0.96 5.58 19.11 37.99 36.19  
•••             
 
Row Index t1: Number of confirmed neighbors of a sensor  
Column Index t2: score of the district where the sensor truly resides 
Figure 4.12 Statistical results from simulation
computed by taking the integral of the distribution function within the verification region; In
the discrete version, the in-region confidence is the sum of the probabilities of all points within
the verification region. We discuss the technical details in following sections.
4.4.2.1 Scored districts
Notice that communication range is the region that centers at a sensor’s true location with
radius R. Here we define a variant named estimated communication range (ECR) which is
a circle that centers at the sensor’s estimated location. The VC uses the ECRs of a sensor’s
confirmed neighbors to divide the field into several regions. Each region has a score which is
the number of the ECRs that cover this region. An example is shown in Figure 4.11(b), the
solid and hollow circles represent sensors’ true and estimated locations respectively. Sensor
S1 has three confirmed neighbors: sensors S2, S3 and S4. The field is divided into six regions
which belong to three districts. The 0-scored district contains region A1; the 1-scored district
contains regions A2, A3 and A4; and the 2-scored district contains regions A5 and A6.
We notice that a sensor may not be inside the highest-scored district, because the ECRs
are estimated communication ranges and may not cover a sensor’s true location. However,
we guess the probability that a sensor is inside a higher-scored district is higher, given that
sensors are localized with reasonable errors. In the following, we will prove this conjecture
using simulation data.
If the data can be collected from the field, then they can be directly used for our purpose.
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Otherwise, simulations should be conducted using proper network parameters. In our simula-
tion, 600 sensors are randomly deployed in a square field of 300m×300m. The communication
range is R = 20m. Each sensor averagely has 12 neighbors in its communication range. The
environmental disturbance is quantified by f = 10%, which means a sensor has 90% chance
to receive a beacon message from its neighbor. For each sensor, we record the number of con-
firmed neighbors it has, then we divide the field into several scored districts and record which
scored-district contain the sensor’s true location.
The results of all sensors are summarized in Figure 4.12. In this table, row index is the
number of confirmed neighbors, and column index is the score of district. Element T (t1, t2) = p
means that among all the sensors that have t1 confirmed neighbors, p% of them are inside a
district that scores t2. For instance, T (3, 2) = 27.18 means among all the sensors that have 3
confirmed neighbors, 27.18% are inside score-2 district.
The VC uses the above training table to assign different weights to different districts. We
still use the example in Figure 4.11(b) to explain the procedure. In the figure, there are
three districts divided for sensor s1, which have scores 0, 1 and 2 respectively. Since S1 has
3 confirmed neighbors, so VC refers to the 3rd row in the table. The weights corresponding
to score 0,1 and 2 are T (3, 0) = 0.22, T (3, 1) = 4.09 and T (3, 2) = 27.18. Based on these
weights, the probabilities that sensor S1 resides inside different districts can be computed. For
example, the probability S1 is inside score-2 district is 27.18/(0.22 + 4.09 + 27.18) = 0.8631.
The formula for calculating the in-district probabilities is given by:
Pr(Li ∈ Dim) = T (ni,m)∑
k∈Minc T (ni, k)
, ∀m ∈Minc, (4.29)
where Dim is the m-scored district, ni is the number of si’s confirmed neighbors, and Minc is
the set of distinct scores of all districts divided for sensor si.
4.4.2.2 Continuous distribution
The probability density function (pdf) specifies the probability density that a sensor may
reside at different points in the field. By equation (4.29), we have calculated in-district prob-
abilities. We adopt the assumption that the probability distribution within one district is
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uniform. Because a sensor will have exactly the same number of confirmed neighbors at two
points within one district, thus the two points cannot be statistically differentiated. Based on
this assumption, we can compute the in-district probability density by dividing the in-district
probability by the district’s area. For instance, in Figure 4.11(b), if the area value of score-2
district is 12m2, and the probability that S1 is in this district is 0.8631, then the probability
density at any point within score-2 district is 0.8631/12 = 0.0719. The formula for calculating
the pdf function for sensor si can be given by:
pdfi(l) =
Pr(Li ∈ Dim)
S(Dim)
,∀l ∈ Dim, (4.30)
where the dividend Pr(Li ∈ Dim) is the in-district probability in equation (4.29), and the
divisor S(Dim) is the area value of the m-scored district Dim.
4.4.2.3 Discrete distribution
Since it is relatively expensive to calculate the district’s area S(Dim) in equation (4.30).
Therefore, we now discuss how to calculate a discrete distribution that does not involve complex
computations.
We notice that the weights corresponding to the zero-scored district (the first column in the
training table in Figure 4.12) have very small values, and secondly, the area of zero-scored dis-
trict is very large (approximates the area of the whole field). Therefore, the probability density
inside zero-scored district will be very small. Based on this observation, in our algorithm, VC
determines a potential scope and only focus on the interior of this scope. We use the example
in Figure 4.11(c) to explain the determination of the potential scope. In the figure, sensor S1
has three confirmed neighbors S2, S3 and S4. The boundaries of the potential scope are the
tangent lines of the three ECRs. Obviously, the potential scope will cover all nonzero-scored
districts.
Within the potential scope, the VC samples points uniformly and assigns different proba-
bility to each point. And the probabilities of all points in a district should sum to the in-district
probability calculated by equation (4.29). Therefore, the probability mass function (pmf) of
sensor si is given by:
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pmfi(l) =

Pr(Li∈Dim)
N(Dim)
, l ∈ Pi,
0, otherwise,
where the dividend Pr(Li ∈ Dim) is the in-district probability in equation (4.30), N(Dim) is
the number of sampled points in district Dim, and Pi is the potential scope of sensor Si.
4.4.2.4 Verification confidence
The verification confidence is the confidence that a sensor can be verified within the verifi-
cation region. If the distribution is continuous, the in-region confidence is computed by taking
the two-dimensional integral of the probability density function in equation (4.30) within the
verification region:
Pr(Li ∈ Vi) =
∫ ∫
Vi
pdf i(x, y)dxdy (4.31)
If the distribution is discrete, the in-region confidence is the addition of probabilities of all
points in the verification region:
Pr(Li ∈ Vi) =
∑
l∈Pi
pmf i(l) · I(l ∈ Vi), (4.32)
where I is an indicator function which outputs 1 if l ∈ Vi, and outputs 0 otherwise.
After the VC provides the verification confidence to the control center, the center will
compare the confidence with an application-specific threshold to make proper decisions. In
the battlefield surveillance application, sensor Si detects a tank and its location is verified by
the VC. Then the verification confidence is compared with a threshold to decide whether to
project a bomb. Therefore, Pr(Li ∈ Vi) ≥ t ⇒ project a bomb,Pr(Li ∈ Vi) < t ⇒ not project a bomb,
where t is the threshold and its value is application specific. If t is set high, false alarms can
be easily filtered out and bombs will not be wasted on non-existing targets; if t is set low, few
targets will escape from being destroyed, but some bombs might be exploded for nothing. No
matter how the threshold is determined, we expect a verification algorithm that is not sensitive
to threshold values. Namely, when the thresholds fall into a large range of values, both the
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Figure 4.13 Attacks to the verification algorithm
false negative rate and false positive rate can maintain at satisfactory levels. In Section 6, we
will study the false positive/negative rates of our verification algorithm, and it shows that our
algorithm has good verification performance with various thresholds settings.
4.4.2.5 Security analysis
When WSNs are deployed in hostile environment, adversaries may purposely disrupt the
verification process. Since the VC purely rely on sensors’ neighborhood observations to derive
probability distributions of sensors’ locations, the attackers will try to generate misleading
neighborhood observations. We illustrate the possible attacks in Figure 4.13 which contains
four sub-figures: (I) a compromised sensor broadcasts an incorrect ID, hence, other sensors
report wrong neighborhood observation; (II) a compromised sensor directly reports wrong
neighborhood observation; (III) two sensors that are localized far away from each other coop-
erate and claim to observe each other; (IV) wormhole attackers record beacon messages at one
location, tunnel them through a wired link and replay at another location. Thus, the sensors
at the two ends of the wormhole will both report to observe the other.
In our algorithm, the VC confirms the neighboring relationship of two sensors only when
they can observe each other. Since the first two attacks (attack I and II) generate asymmetric
observations between sensors, their neighborhood observations will not be considered by the
VC for further use. However, the colluding attack and the wormhole attacks (attack III and IV)
are both capable to generate symmetric observations between a pair of sensors. Therefore, a
far-away neighbor of a sensor may contribute a nonzero-scored district in the field. However, we
notice only high-scored districts bear high densities and have major impact on the distribution
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function, thus as long as the majority of a sensor’s confirmed neighbors are benign, the high-
scored districts will not be greatly distorted.
We introduce a parameter c to indicate the colluding degree. These neighbors provide
fake location references but they collaboratively make their estimated locations close to each
other. This attack is the most sophisticated attack the adversary can launch, and the cost
is that they need to compromise many sensors to cheat on one sensor’s verification. In the
simulation, we set the value of c in the range of (0, 50%), and we notice that the distribution
functions are not much distorted. In other words, as long as the colluding degree is minority,
the verification confidence can be calculated with small errors, which still helps applications
make correct decisions.
4.5 Simulation Study
4.5.1 Simulation Setup and Parameters
In the standard setup, we deploy n = 600 sensors randomly in a 300m× 300m square field.
The communication range is R = 20m. Each sensor can observe 12 neighbors on average.
Sensors’ localization errors follow the Gaussian distribution and the mean and deviation of the
distribution are both 10m. Among all sensors in the field, we randomly select p% sensors that
are localized with errors greater than the anomaly degree D, while other sensors are localized
with errors uniformly distribute within the range of [0, D]. We consider distance measuring
errors and use the following equation: d˜ = d+ d ∗ nf , where d is the distance between sensors’
true locations and nf is the noise factor that uniformly distributes within range [−0.1, 0.1].
We consider the following attack model: first, the victim sensor does not broadcast its ID
message, thus its true neighbors will not observe it; second, multiple sensors collude together
and claim to observe the sensor. These colluding sensors all have been compromised and are
physically near the claimed location of the victim. The percentage of compromised neighbors,
namely the colluding degree, is denoted by c. We assume benign neighbors are the majority
in a local area, so that c is in the range of (0, 0.5).
The criteria we use to evaluate the verification performance are Detection Rate (DR) and
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False Positive Rate (FR). They are conflict criteria, because when thresholds are set low, both
DR and FR will increase, and vice versa. A good verification algorithm should be designed to
achieve high detection rate but low false positive rate. In the following, we will study both the
on-spot and in-region verification performance of our verification algorithms.
4.5.2 On-spot Verification Performance
We formally define the evaluation criteria for the on-spot verification. The estimated
locations with errors larger than D are called abnormal locations, while those with errors
smaller than D are called correct locations. Therefore, Detection Rate (DR) is defined as the
ratio between the number of abnormal locations being detected and the number of all abnormal
locations, namely:
DR = Ndf/Nf , (4.33)
where Ndf is the number of abnormal locations detected by VC, and Nf is the number of all
abnormal locations.
Similarly, the false positive (false alarm) rate is defined by:
FP = Ndt/Nt, (4.34)
where Ndt is the number of correct locations that are wrongly detected by VC, and Nt is the
number of all correct locations.
In the following sections, we vary the value of anomaly degree, the percentage of abnormal
locations, and the total number of sensors, so that we can test how the verification algorithms
perform in different scenarios.
4.5.2.1 Impact of anomaly degrees
Figure 4.14 shows the Receive Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for GFM and GFT
algorithms under different values of D. Each point on the ROC curve is obtained by averaging
on twenty sample runs in the field. Based on the curves, we can conclude that (1) Both
verification algorithms achieve higher detection rate for higher anomaly degree. For example,
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Figure 4.14 Impact of anomaly degrees
when anomaly degree is 20m, 30m and 40m respectively, GFT ’s detection rates is 65%, 85%
and almost 100%, given that the false positive rate is 5%. This is in accordance with our
expectation, because the farther a sensor’s estimated location is away from its true location,
the more inconsistency will be introduced into the system. (2) Secondly, we can see that GFM
outperforms GFT in detecting minor anomalies, but underperforms GFT in detecting severe
anomalies. For example, when anomaly degree D = 20m, GFM’s detection rate is 75% and
GFT’s is 70%, given false positive rate is 10%. However, when D = 40m, GFM’s detection rate
is 85% which is lower than GFT’s detection rate 100%. Therefor, VC can select verification
algorithm according to the given anomaly degree. If severe abnormal locations are more desired
to be detected, GFT algorithm will be better, otherwise GFM will be the choice.
4.5.2.2 Impact of the percentage of abnormal locations
In this experiment, we vary the percentage p% of abnormal locations, in order to test
whether GFM and GFT algorithms can still provide solid verifications.
We maintain the false positive rate at 5%, change the value of p and calculate the corre-
sponding detection rate. The results are depicted in Figure 4.15. We can observe that the
detection rate for both algorithms decreases as the percentage of abnormal locations increases.
Moreover, both algorithms are more tolerant to large percentages when the anomaly degree is
91
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Percentage of Compromised Nodes(n)
D
et
ec
tio
n 
R
at
e 
(D
R
)
 
 
TI, D=40
TI, D=30
TI, D=20
GFM, D=40
GFM, D=30
GFM, D=20
 
Figure 4.15 Impact of attack percentage
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Figure 4.16 Impact of network density
higher. For example, when anomaly degree is 40m and the percentage is 30%, GFT’s detection
rate is above 90%. But when anomaly degree is 30m and the percentage is still 30%, GFT’s
detection rate drops to 70%.
From this experiment, we conclude that the GFM and GFT verification algorithms are
more suitable for verifying sensors’ location where the majority sensors are correctly localized,
i.e., when over 90% sensors are correctly localized, then the abnormal locations will be easily
detected.
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4.5.2.3 Impact of network density
The goal of this experiment is to study how network density can impact the performance of
the verification algorithms. In Figure 4.15, we observe that both GFM’s and GFT’s detection
rates increase as the network density increases. For example, when the number of sensors
increases from 400 to 700, the detection rate of GFM raises from 65% to 85%, given that the
false positive is maintained at 5%. Secondly, we can observe that GFM outperforms GFT when
the false positive rate is maintained at relatively small value, but GFM underperforms GFT
when false positive rate increases. For instance, when FP = 1%, the curve representing GFM’s
detection rate is always above the other curve that representing GFT’s, and when FP = 10%,
the opposite happens. Therefore, the VC can choose the verification algorithm according to
the application requirement about the false positive rate.
4.5.3 In-region Verification Performance
In this section, we test how the in-region verification performs in the battlefield surveillance
application. We deploy N tanks randomly in the field. The sensing distance is 10m, so that
sensors within 10m from the tank can detect it. We set the bombing radius as Rx = 25m
and set the bombing center as the average location of estimated locations of all sensors that
detect a same tank. We assume the anomaly degree is D = 25m. Among all sensors, 10%
are localized with errors larger than 25m and the rest are localized with errors in the range
[0, 25m].
We define the evaluation criteria as follows:
DR = Ndf/Nd, (4.35)
FP = Ndt/Nt, (4.36)
where Ndf is the number of tanks that should be destroyed, Nd is the number of tanks that
are indeed destroyed (based on the verification information), Nt is the number of tanks that
should NOT be destroyed, and Ndt is the number of tanks that are wrongly destroyed.
We test the in-region verification performance in four different scenarios which we described
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Figure 4.17 Missile projection
in section 5.1. The ROC curves are shown in Figure 4.17. We can observe that the best
performance is achieved under the “unknown distance known angle” situation: when FR is 15%,
DR can reach 90%. The curve obtained in the situation of “unknown distance unknown angle”
performs the second: when FR is 15%, DR is about 85%. We also notice angle measurements
can improve the verification performance, but only slightly. For example, the curve that
corresponds to “known angle” is about 3% higher than than the peer which corresponds to
“unknown angle”.
Based on the simulation results, we can conclude that the proposed in-region verification
algorithm can be effectively applied to battlefield surveillance application. Even when no
distance or angle can be measured by sensors, the algorithm yields satisfactory (or even better)
verification results.
4.6 Conclusion
We notice that detection and removal of information anomaly is very important for con-
structing a trustworthy communication system. In this work, we studied location anomalies
detection and proposed several algorithms, which can also be extended to detect general com-
munication anomalies. More precisely, we proposed three lightweight verification algorithms.
The on-spot verification algorithms, including GFM and GFT algorithm, verify whether the
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locations claimed by sensors are far from their true spots beyond a certain distance. Sensors’
neighborhood observations are explored for the information inconsistencies. In-region verifica-
tion verifies whether a sensor is inside an application-specific verification region. We proposed
a probabilistic method that computes the confidence that a sensor is inside the verification
region. Our work takes the first step tempting to integrate the application requirements into
determining the trustability of sensors’ estimated locations. Moreover, compared to previous
works, our proposed verification algorithms are more lightweight, effective and robust. They
do not require any dedicated or expensive infrastructures in the field; they yield satisfactory
verification results to a variety of applications, which is approved by the simulation results;
furthermore, they are resilient to malicious attacks and can be used in hostile environments.
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CHAPTER 5. DISTRIBUTING CONFIDENTIAL LOCATION
INFORMATION USING NETWORK CODING
5.1 Introduction
Network coding [3][67] is a new message forwarding technique that allows a forwarder
to encode multiple input messages together to form an output one. Unlike the traditional
approach that always duplicates every forwarding message, network coding is able to maximize
the throughput of multicast networks. In 2003, Li et al. [67] further proved that linear network
coding is sufficient to achieve the optimal throughput, which is the minimum of the max-flows
from the single source to sinks. Because of this nice property, network coding has been widely
used not only in wired networks [21][39], but also in wireless networks [9][19][56][57][79][86].
Network coding systems suffer from various malicious attacks, including wiretapping at-
tacks (passive attacks) and pollution attacks (active attacks). While great research efforts have
been devoted to prevent or mitigate pollution attacks, there have been relatively less promising
solutions that efficiently and effectively prevent or mitigate wiretapping attacks.
Wiretapping attack was defined by Cai et al. in [14]. In this attack, adversaries are
capable to wiretap or eavesdrop on a subset of the links of some network coding system and
gain access to the information transmitted through the links. The problem is how to prevent
information from leaking to adversaries. Traditional approaches require end-to-end or hop-
by-hop encryption. However, for the end-to-end approach, if a large amount of the encrypted
information is obtained by adversaries, they will conduct known-ciphertext attack to learn the
real contents of the messages. For the hop-by-hop encryption, since every pair of neighboring
nodes need to share a secret key, not only extra communication overhead will be caused by the
key setup/update process, but also much delay will be introduced by encryption/decryption
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at every hop.
To defend against wiretapping attacks without encryption, an approach is to introduce
randomness into the source messages. Several solutions [8][14][33][53] based on this idea have
been proposed. These solutions can be categorized into two classes: Shannon-secure ones and
weakly-secure ones. The difference is that Shannon-secure ones do not allow any information
leakage, while weakly-secure ones do not allow any meaningful information leakage. As an
example, given two information symbols x1 and x2, in weakly-secure schemes, the adversaries
may learn the value of x1 +x2 but not x1 or x2 alone; in Shannon-secure schemes, they cannot
learn neither of x1, x2 nor the combination x1 + x2.
All existing secure solutions for network coding consume more communication overhead
compared to insecure codings. First, when random symbols are introduced into the message
vector sent from the source, the real information symbols that can be transmitted are de-
creased, i.e., the multicast capacity is decreased. If we want to multicast the same amount of
information as that in insecure coding system, then more multicast session will be involved
and thus more network energy will be consumed. Second, secure solutions enlarge the size of
the finite field over which the coding is done (for the purpose of maintaining security proper-
ties). Therefore, more binary bits are needed to represent symbols and encoding coefficients,
which increase the bandwidth consumptions. In resource-constrained networks such as wireless
sensor networks, bandwidth is very limited and network energy is a very scarce resource, the
wireless communications between nodes can drain their energy quickly, which will shorten the
network lifetime and severely impact network functionalities.
In this research, we aim to design efficient weakly-secure network coding schemes that are
suitable for energy-constrained networks. We focus on weak security because some network
coding applications may not have perfect secure requirements in practice. Fortunately, if
the security requirement can be weakened, not only the loss in multicast rate but also the
enlargement of finite field can be avoided, which are the two major drawbacks associated with
previous solutions.
We propose two coding schemes against wiretapping attacks. The first is a basic scheme
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which introduces only one random symbol into the messages vector sent by the source, and
increases the finite field to the extent such that the last element in the vector can be protected.
The second is an advanced scheme which introduces no random symbol. It maintains the
maximum multicast capacity and retains the size of the finite field. Both our schemes utilize
a special permutation functions to generate randomness. The input and output range of the
function are the finite field of the coding scheme, and the function can be implemented using
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) or its variants.
5.2 Problem Statement
5.2.1 System Model
A network coding system can be represented by a tuple (G, α,U). In the tuple, G = (V,E)
is a directed acyclic graph, and V and E are the set of nodes and edges of G. The capacity
of each edge indicates the maximum average rate of information that can be transmitted on
this edge. The single source α generates and sends out a message vector X every time unit,
which consists of n symbols in a finite field Fq, i.e., X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)T ∈ Fnq . A set of users
denoted by U receive and recover the multicast information, and |U| = u. In linear coding
systems, the message on any outgoing edge of a node is a linear combination of the messages
on its incoming edges. So the message on any edge can be written as a linear combination of
the source symbols. We denote the message transmitted on edge e by TeX, where Te, named
the encoding vector, is a row vector over finite field Fnq .
5.2.2 Threat Model
In wiretapping attack, the adversaries are able to wiretap or eavesdrop on a subset of the
edges in a network coding system and gain access to the information transmitted on these
edges. Precisely, they can wiretap on one (but no more than one) subsect in a collection
A = {A1, A2, · · · , A|A|}, where Ai represents a set of edges. We can define an eavesdropping
matrix Mi of dimension ki × n corresponding to each Ai, where each row in Mi represents an
encoding vector and ki is the maximum number of linearly independent encoding vectors on
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edges in set Ai. For each Mi, the information available to the eavesdropper is a set of linear
equations denoted by MiX = Bi, where Bi is a vector consisted of ki symbols heard on the ki
edges in Ai.
Besides the above model, a second model has also been used by researchers to quantify
the capacity of the eavesdroppers. In this model, the adversary can access to at most k edges.
This model can be viewed as a special case of the first model when the collection A contains
all non-empty subsets of at most k edges in the network.
In this research, we consider the most powerful wiretapping model, where the wiretapper
can obtain any subset of at most n− 1 edges in the network. This model is equivalent to the
second model when k is equal to n − 1. Note that we do not need to consider any adversary
more powerful than what we consider here, because if a wiretapper can obtain n or more
linearly independent equations, then he is essentially of no difference from normal users in
terms of information amount, thus there would be no solution to prevent information leakage.
5.2.3 Security Goals
The security goal is to prevent the source information from leaking to the adversaries.
We can categorize the security goals into Shannon-secure and weakly-secure. The difference
between them is that Shannon-secure does not allow the leakage of any information about the
source, while weakly-secure does not allow the leakage of any meaningful information. Formally
speaking, for any Mi ∈ M, Shannon security requires that H(X|MiX = Bi) = H(X), while
weak security requires that H(xi|MiX = Bi) = H(xi), for all xi in message vector X. As an
example, given two source symbols x1 and x2, weak security allows the adversaries to gain the
value of x1 + x2, but Shannon security does not permit such leakage.
In this research, we focus on designing weakly-secure network coding schemes. We notice
weakly-secure coding can be used in some applications that do not have very strict secure
requirements. It has already drawn some research interests [8][53] in recent years. Fortunately,
if the security requirement can be weakened to weakly-secure, not only the loss in multicast rate
but also the enlargement of finite field over which the source symbols and encoding coefficients
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are selected, can be avoided. This feature is very desirable in some coding system (such as
wireless sensor networks) where the energy is a scarce resource and communication overhead
needs to be minimized.
5.3 Scheme I: A Basic Scheme
In this section, we propose a scheme that can be applied to an existing insecure coding and
make it weakly-secure. All linear operations including addition, substraction, multiplication
and division are conducted over finite field Fq.
5.3.1 Randomizing at the Source
Assume the maximum multicast capacity is n in a coding system, namely, the source can
multicast a vector consisted of n symbols to all the receivers in one time unit. In our scheme,
the source firstly selects a random symbol w from the finite field Fq and inserts it to the end
of the message vector. So the message vector sent by the source is X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn−1, w)T ,
where x1 to xn−1 are information symbols and w is the inserted random symbol.
The source utilizes a random permutation function h together with w to randomize the
information symbols. The input and output of function h are both elements in the finite field
Fq. This function serves as a random number generator and can be constructed using Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [72] or its variants [22][36]. As we will discuss later, LFSR is
very efficient for low-cost nodes to implement in hardware. Note that the construction of h
function is public, so all the nodes and even adversaries know how to build it.
The source uses the h function and computes a vector X ′ = (x′1, x′2, · · · , x′n)T where
x′1 = x1 + h(w)
x′2 = x2 + h2(w)
· · · · · ·
x′n−1 = xn−1 + hn−1(w)
x′n = w
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Here h2(w) = h(h(w)) means that h function is applied twice to parameter w; h3(w) means h
function is applied for three times to parameter w, and so forth.
After the source calculates the vector X ′, it multiplies a full rank matrix C of dimension
n×n to X ′ and get X ′′ = CX ′. The full-rank matrix C should have the property that the last
row of its reverse matrix C−1 is not in the linear span of all eavesdropping matrixes that have
dimension (n− 1)× n. We will explain why we require such property for matrix C in Section
III-D. Finally, the source injects vector X ′′ into the network, and the vector can be multicast
to all receivers using any feasible insecure network code.
5.3.2 Decoding at the Receivers
Given that the existing network code is feasible (though it is not secure), each destination
node first decodes each elements in vector X ′′ by solving a set of linear equations. Then the
receiver obtains vector X ′ by X ′ = C−1X ′′, where C−1 is the reverse of full-rank matrix C.
Now since the receiver knows the value of w, which is the last element in vector X ′, he can
calculate x1 to xn−1 by:
xi = x
′
i − hi(w), i ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}.
Therefore, the receiver can decode all information symbols.
5.3.3 Implementation Details
In our scheme, the permutation function can be implemented using the basic Linear Feed-
back Shift Register (LFSR) [72], or its variance such as the Shrinking Generator [22] and the
Alternating Step Generator (ASG) [36].
LFSR is a simple circuit that consists of shift registers and XOR gates. For an L-bit LFSR,
L shift registers are used to store one bit each, and the circuit is constructed based on an
irreducible polynomial over the finite field F2 with a degree of L. For example, 16-bit Galois
LFSR will be constructed according to the feedback polynomial x16 +x14 +x13 +x11 +1. Tables
such as [95] have been created to show where the taps should be placed. The sequence that
an LFSR produces has good statistical properties, and can be considered as a series of pseudo
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random numbers [72]. Being pseudo random, and not random, comes from the fact that the
sequence does follow a mathematical formula. However, if the seed of the LFSR is kept secret,
the LFSR can be used to create L-bit random secrets. Besides the basic LFSR, the Shrinking
Generator and the ASG can also be used and they provide better statistical properties in term
of period length and linear complexity.
5.3.4 Security Analysis
We notice that in order to solve for an information symbol xi, both the symbol x
′
i =
xi +h
i(w) and the random number w should be known, otherwise, the randomness introduced
by the h function cannot be removed.
In order to get the value of w, the eavesdropper will try to perform linear transmission to
the set of equations he has obtained and solves for the last variable x′n. In other words, he
will try to use MX ′′ = MCX ′ = B, where M denotes any eavesdropping matrix of dimension
(n− 1)×n, to obtain InX ′ = x′n, where In = (0, · · · , 1) is a row vector whose last element is 1
and other elements are 0. To achieve the transformation from MC to In, the adversary needs
to find a row vector t, such that tMC = In, or equivalently, the adversary needs to find a row
vector t such that tM = InC
−1. However, since the last row of matrix C−1 is not in the linear
span of matrix M according to the rule when we construct C, such a vector t does not exist
and the above transmission cannot be possibly conducted. Therefore, the wiretapper is unable
to remove the randomness and cannot solve for any xi. The proposed network code scheme is
weakly-secure.
5.3.5 Discussion
Compared to insecure network code, our basic secure scheme achieves weakly secure but
gives up some performance. First, the multicast capacity is reduced by 1/n because in one
time unit, only n− 1 information symbols can be multicast to all receivers instead of n.
Second, since we require the last row of the reverse matrix C−1 is not in the linear span
of any eavesdropping matrix M , the size of the finite field has to be enlarged. Precisely, when
102
we construct matrix C, we first select the last row in matrix C−1, then complete other rows in
C−1 while ensuring all rows are linearly independent such that the matrix is full rank. Finally,
we reverse C−1 back to obtain C. In this process, finite field is enlarged in the first step. Since
the last row of C−1 cannot be in the linear span of any eavesdropping matrix M , the finite field
should be large enough so that such a row can be found, namely, qn >
 |E|
n− 1
 qn−1, where
the scaler at the right side is the total number of eavesdropping matrix that has dimension
(n − 1) × n. Therefore, the lower bound is q >
 |E|
n− 1
. We notice this lower bound
is larger than that required by insecure schemes, i.e., q > u, especially in large networks
which consist a large number of edges. The direct consequence is that we need more binary
bits to represent symbols and encoding coefficients, so more communication bandwidth will
be consumed. Consider an example where u = 20 users exist in a network which contains
|E| = 100 edges and the optimal multicast rate is n = 10. The bandwidth consumption is
q > 20 using insecure codes, but is increased to about q > 1018 using the secure one.
To improve the basic scheme, we propose an advanced scheme in the next section. The
nice features of the advanced scheme include: first, no random symbols need to be inserted
into the message vector, thus the maximum multicast capacity is maintained. Second, both
the information symbols and encoding coefficients can be taken from the same finite field
as in insecure schemes. Third, neither the source nor the destination nodes need to make
transmissions to the message vector, i.e., no full-rank matrix C is needed to translate X ′ into
X ′′, thus computation overhead is reduced.
A comparison between our basic and advanced schemes and some previous solutions is
shown in TABLE 5.1.
5.4 Scheme II: An Advanced Scheme
5.4.1 Randomizing at the Source
In the advanced scheme, no random symbols are inserted into the message vector. Instead,
the source applies the h function to the information symbols directly. The h function is
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constructed in the same way as in the basic scheme, i.e., it randomly maps an integer in Fq
into another integer in Fq.
If the multicast capacity of the network is 2, then the message vector sent by the source is
X ′ = (x′1, x′2)T where  x
′
1 = x1 + h(x2)
x′2 = h(x′1) + x2
In general case where the multicast capacity of the network is n (n ≥ 2), then the message
vector X ′ = (x1, · · · , x′n)T is:
x′1 = x1 + h(x2)
x′2 = x2 + h(x3)
· · · · · ·
x′n−1 = xn−1 + h(xn)
x′n = h(x′1) + · · ·+ h(x′n−1) + xn
Then the source can multicast X ′ to all receivers using any feasible insecure network code.
5.4.2 Decoding at the Receivers
After a destination node receives a set of linear equations, it first solves for the elements in
X ′, then it calculates xn, xn−1, · · · , x1 iteratively using the following formulas:
xn = x
′
n − h(x′1) + · · ·+ h(x′n−1)
xn−1 = x′n−1 − h(xn)
xn−2 = x′n−2 − h(xn−1)
· · · · · ·
x1 = x
′
1 − h(x2)
In this way, the receivers decode all information symbols.
5.4.3 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we will prove that if the wiretappers cannot obtain more than n − 1
linearly independent equations, then the proposed advanced coding scheme is weakly-secure.
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Table 5.1 Performance Comparison (Eavesdropping capacity k=n-1)
Security Multicast Rate Finite Field Size
Insecure Schemes None n u
Cai et al. [14] Shannon 1
( |E|
n-1
)
Feldman et al. [33] Shannon <1 <
( |E|
n-1
)
Bhattad et al. [8] Weakly n
( |E|
n-1
)
+1
Our Basic Weakly n-1
( |E|
n-1
)
Our Advanced Weakly n u
5.4.3.1 Simplified Scenario
We start by proving the security property in a simplified situation where the length of
message vector is two, i.e., X ′ = (x′1, x′2)T . The wiretapper can wiretap an arbitrary edge e in
the network, and obtain one linear combination of the symbols, namely,
TeX ′ = t1 · x′1 + t2 · x′2 = b, (5.1)
where Te = (t1, t2) is the encoding vector on edge e, and b is the symbol transmitted on edge
e. We analyze the security property through the following three cases depending on whether
t1 or t2 is zero.
• Case 1: t1 = 0, t2 6= 0, so equation (5.1) is written as:
t2 · x′2 = t2 · [h(x1 + h(x2)) + x2] = b (5.2)
We introduce a free variable y which can take arbitrary value in Fq, then the solutions
to the above equation can be expressed in terms of y, such that: x1 = y − h(b/t2 − h(y))x2 = b/t2 − h(y)
Given any value for y within finite field Fq, a pair of solutions for (x1, x2) can be calculated
using the above equations. In other words, x1 and x2 can take any value over Fq according
to different value of y in the field. The conditional entropy H(xi|TeX ′ = b) is equal to
H(xi). This network code is weakly-secure.
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• Case 2: t1 6= 0, t2 = 0, then equation (5.1) is written as:
t1 · x′1 = t1 · (x1 + h(x2)) = b. (5.3)
Here x2 can be viewed as a free variable which can take arbitrary value in Fq. For a
given value of x2, the symbol x1 is calculated by x1 = b/t1−h(x2). Since both x1 and x2
can take arbitrary value in Fq, i.e., H(xi|TeX ′ = b) = H(xi) for any information symbol
xi ∈ X, our scheme is weakly-secure.
• Case 3: If t1 6= 0 and t2 6= 0, then equation (5.1) is equivalent to the following:
t1x1 + t1h(x2) + t2h(x1 + h(x2)) + t2x2 = b. (5.4)
Similar to Case 1, we introduce variable y and express the solutions for x1 and x2 in
terms of y, such that:  x1 = y − h((b− t1y − t2h(y))/t2)x2 = (b− t1y − t2h(y))/t2
Given an arbitrary value for y in the finite field Fq, the solutions for x1 and x2 can be
calculated accordingly. Again we have H(xi|TeX ′ = b) = H(xi) for x1 and x2, which
indicates security property of our scheme.
5.4.3.2 General Scenario
Now we analyze the general scenario where the multicast capacity is n (n ≥ 2).
Since the wiretapper can obtain at most n−1 linearly independent equations, which means
that he cannot solve for all the elements in vector X ′, so he cannot use equations (5.1) to
find out the values of any symbol from x1 to xn. However, he may try to perform linear
transmissions to the equation set, and we will analyze such attacks in details at the following.
By taking linear transformation of the set of equations MX ′ = B, where M denote
any eavesdropping matrix of dimension (n − 1) × n, the wiretapper can obtain a function
of x′1, · · · , x′n, which has the following general form:
t1x
′
1 + · · ·+ tnx′n = d, (5.5)
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where t1, · · · , tn are coefficients over the finite field Fq. Since we don’t specify the edges (and
the encoding vectors on these edges) being eavesdropped, ti can take arbitrary values. Equation
(5.5) can also be written as:
t1 · [x1 + h(x2)] + · · ·+ tn−1 · [xn−1 + h(xn)] +
tn · [h(x1 + h(x2)) + · · ·+ h(xn−1 + h(xn)) + xn] = d (5.6)
Now we analyze the security property in two cases.
• Case 1: If tn 6= 0, we introduce n − 1 variables yi ∈ Fq, for i = 1, · · · , n − 1. For any
given value of the vector (y1, · · · , yn−1)T ∈ Fn−1q , we can give the following solutions for
x1, · · · , xn that satisfy equation (5.6):
xn =
d−∑n−1i=1 ti·yi
tn
−∑n−1i=1 h(yi)
xn−1 = yn−1 − h(xn)
· · ·
x2 = y2 − h(x3)
x1 = y1 − h(x2)
The correctness of above solutions can be easily verified. Due to space limitation, we
omit the proof here. Note that in this solution, xn−1, · · · , x1 can be iteratively expressed
in term of the free variables y1, · · · , yn−1. To eliminate the randomness caused by the free
variables, the adversary may manipulate coefficients ti. If all ti for i = 1, · · · , n − 1 are
zero, then the linear random part
∑n−1
i=1 tiyi becomes zero and is eliminated. However,
there is no way to get rid of the non-linear part
∑n−1
i=1 h(yi), so the randomness in xn
cannot be removed. Since other symbols are iteratively expressed in terms of xn, their
values cannot be solved either.
• Case 2: when tn = 0, then there will be at least one coefficient among t1 to tn−1 that is
non-zero. We denote these non-zero coefficients by {tk1 , · · · , tkm} ⊆ {t1, · · · , tn}, where
1 ≤ k1 < · · · < km ≤ n − 1. It can be proved that any xi where i /∈ {tk1 , · · · , tkm} is
free variable, and they can take any value in Fq without affecting the correctness of the
equation. Now we introduce a set of km free variables z1, z2, · · · , zkm over Fq. Then we
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are able to express information symbols xk1 , · · · , xkm in term of free variables only, such
that: 
xkm =
d−∑kmi=k1 ti·zi
tkm
− h(xkm+1)
xkm−1 = zkm−1 − h(xkm−1+1)
· · ·
xk1 = zk1 − h(xk1+1)
The correctness of above solutions can be verified. Again, we see that none of the
information symbols can be solved and the entropy H(xi|MX ′ = B) = H(xi) for all
xi ∈ X. Hence, this advanced network code scheme achieves weak security.
5.5 Conclusion
In this research, we propose efficient schemes for securing linear network coding against
wiretapping attacks. They exploit the permutation function and the interleaved relationship
between transmitted symbols to achieve randomness. The advanced scheme maintains the
multicast capacity as that can be achieved in insecure network codings, and does not enlarge
the finite field over which the coding should be done. Therefore, it is especially suitable for
resource-constrained wireless networks. To the best of our knowledge, our advanced scheme
is the first solution to wiretapping attacks that have the above two desired properties. In the
future, we will evaluate our schemes by implementing it on MicaZ nodes.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMERY
6.1 Conclusion
In this research, we focus on designing a secure location-aware communication system for
energy-constrained wireless network such as wireless sensor networks. There are three key
aspects when building such a system, namely, location determination, location anomaly de-
tection, and location information distribution. For each of the three aspect, we design many
practical techniques to defend against a variety of malicious attacks. Particularly, we study the
following important problems: (1) providing correct location estimations for sensors in presence
of wormhole attacks and pollution attacks, (2) detecting location anomalies according to the
application-specific requirements of the verification accuracy, and (3) preventing information
leakage when using network coding for multicasting location information. To solve each prob-
lem, we propose several innovative algorithms that are efficient for wireless sensor networks in
terms of hardware cost, computation overhead and communication overhead.
In summary, the contribution of our research are as follows:
• We first study the problem of providing reliable location information in presence of
wormhole attacks. We propose a dynamic anchor-regrouping localization scheme. Com-
pared with others, our scheme does not require dedicated hardware such as high-precision
measuring device to be quipped on sensor nodes. Moreover, our scheme is more energy-
efficient than other schemes since no extra communication overhead are incurred on
sensors.
• We also address the problem of error propagation or pollution attacks to the localiza-
tion in WSNs. We proposed a robust localization scheme which is based on the novel
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notion of confidence tag to quantify the accuracy of sensor’s location estimation. To
our knowledge, our scheme is the first one to address the problem of the proliferation
of wrong locations. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes in
enhancing the reliability (availability and accuracy) of location information for wireless
sensor networks.
• We study the problem of detecting and revoking location anomalies. We proposed two
schemes to verify whether the location claimed by a sensor deviates from the true one
more than a certain distance. Compared to previous works, our verification algorithms
are very lightweight, because they do not rely on verifiers or any prearranged infrastruc-
tures in the sensor field.
• We also study the in-region verification problem which is to determine whether a sensor
is inside an application-specific area. We proposed a probabilistic algorithm where the
verification center can calculate the confidence that a sensor can be in-region verified.
Our research takes the first step tempting to integrate the application requirements into
determining the trustability of sensors’ locations.
• We propose two secure coding schemes which can effectively prevent information leakage
to eavesdroppers. Using our schemes, the wiretappers can at most obtain linear com-
binations of information symbols, but cannot solve for any single symbol. Compared
other schemes, our advanced scheme have two noticeable benefits for energy-constrained
networks: First, it does not introduce extra communicating into the network and thus
achieves maximum multicast capacity. Second, it does not enlarge the size of the finite
field from which the coding coefficients are selected. Therefore, our scheme consumes less
communication resource than previous works and are very suitable for energy-constrained
wireless networks.
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6.2 Future Work
To provide reliable location estimations for sensors in WSNs, we propose several algorithms
to defend against wormhole attacks and pollution attacks. However, within this research area,
there exist many more challenges and there are still a lot of space of improvements.
• Wormhole attack is a very detrimental and easy-to-launch attack. It can be classified
as anchor-to-sensor wormhole and sensor-to-sensor wormhole depending on the victims
around the end-points of the wormhole tunnel. The formal attack will mislead sensors
to refer to beacon messages sent form far-away anchors, while the latter attack will
make far-apart sensors to believe into residing in the same neighborhood area. As a
result, the network topology based on the neighboring relationships will be disrupted
and sensors’ locations cannot be correctly estimated. Our proposed dynamic regrouping
scheme effectively prevents the anchor-to-sensor wormhole attack. However, preventing
sensor-to-sensor wormhole attack is still an unresolved area and deserves future research
efforts. Especially for multihop localization schemes where not all sensor nods can receive
anchors’ beacon messages, and thus need to use other sensors’ references, the sensor-to-
sensor wormhole will directly impact their localization performance.
• We propose that anchors broadcast with a regrouping range to form local groups for
defending against wormhole attacks. Since current technology enables anchors to adjust
their transmission power within several levels, it will be interesting to investigate how
dynamically changed regrouping range can impact wormhole detection rate. Actually,
current localization schemes do not consider the coordinating opportunities between sen-
sors and anchors, and much potential improvement may be introduced when involving
anchors’ self-adaptive behaviors, such as adjusting transmitting power levels based on
sensors’ feedbacks. Such adaptive/coorparative localization is especially beneficial for
mobile WSNs where localization needs to be performed on a regular basis.
• For defending against pollution attack, we propose two efficient algorithms for calculating
a confidence tag for each sensor’s location. However, the calculation is based on the
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assumption of using trilateration method when a sensor localizes itself. There are many
other localizing techniques which are also subjected to pollution attack. For example,
in DV-hop schemes where sensors utilize the number of hops to anchors, if adversaries
compromise a node and send out wrong hop counts, then all down-steam nodes will be
influenced. We will further investigate this problem and keep on improving our solution.
For detecting location anomalies in wireless sensor network, we study both the on-spot
verification which is to determine whether a sensor is exactly localized at its claimed location,
and the in-region verification which is to verify if a sensor resides within an application-specific
region. In the future, we will continue the research in this area with the following goals.
• First, our approaches have the assumption of a centralized Verification Center (VC)
which performs the verification task and reports to the base station or control center.
However, when sensor network is composed of thousands of nodes, we need to design
distributed solutions to tackle with the scalability issue properly, such as cluster based
verification or hierarchical VC structure.
• For the in-region verification, we use the military surveillance application as an example
for demonstrating the determination of verification region. In the future, we will investi-
gate other location-based applications such as target tracking and geographical routing,
and study how the verification regions can be tuned according to the application func-
tionalities and network parameters.
• Our research takes the first step toward the lightweight location verification system. In
the future, we are planning to set up testbed and apply our schemes to real-life WSNs,
for testing and evaluating the performance and limitations of our approaches.
In this research, we propose efficient schemes for securing linear network coding against
wiretapping attacks. They exploit the permutation function and the interleaved relationship
between transmitted symbols to achieve randomness. In the future, we will evaluate our
schemes by implementing it on sensor node hardware. Moreover, although many algorithms
have been proposed for secure network coding, some problems in this topic are still unresolved.
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• Besides weakly security which is to protect each single information symbol multicast
by the source, in some security-sensitive applications, it is important to conceal any
combinations of the information and achieve shannon secure. Previous schemes either
sacrifice the multicast capacity and/or enlarge the size of finite field on which the coding
is performed, which reduces the benefits that network coding can bring to multicast
communications. In addition, when network coding schemes are applied to real wireless
sensor networks, there are many practical issues such as link delays and cyclic graphs. It
is challenging and interesting to study how to improve the network coding performance
in such situations.
• Besides wiretapping attack, the adversaries can also compromise sensors directly and
prevent the sinks from recovering source messages, which we call active attacks. For
instance, they can launch DOS attack by selectively dropping messages or generating
new messages that are not linearly independent of previous ones, and the result is that
the number of linearly independent messages received by the sinks are decreased and
information symbols cannot be resolved. The adversaries may also insert false sources into
network coding systems, which violates the security goal of authenticity. It is challenging
problem to design homomorphic signature scheme to achieve authenticity and integrity
in linear coding (especially XOR coding) systems.
• To achieve secure and efficient multicast in energy-constrained networks, it is impor-
tant to design scalable multicast architecture. We have done some research over the
IP network, and we will continue the research of constructing multicast architecture in
WSNs. Unless IP Network, there is no Antonymous System in WSNs and multicast
cannot be explicitly categorized at intra-domain and inter-domain levels. We need to
properly decompose WSNs into hierarchical levels based on which the source-encoding
can be performed according to the membership within each level. Also, since sensors are
very limited in energy supplies, the Multicast Agent (MA) for each “domain” cannot be
fixed on a single sensor; in other words, the multicast architecture should dynamically
load balance according to the energy consumption conditions of all sensor nodes.
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